The Contest of Indian Secularism by Hänninen, Erja
  
 
 
 
 
THE CONTEST OF  
INDIAN SECULARISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erja Marjut Hänninen 
 
University of Helsinki 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Political History 
 
Master’s thesis 
 December 2002 
 
 
 I
 
 
Map of India                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 II
 
 
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 
PRESENTATION OF THE TOPIC.................................................................................................................... 3 
AIMS ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 
SOURCES AND LITERATURE ...................................................................................................................... 7 
CONCEPTS............................................................................................................................................... 12 
SECULARISM ..............................................................................................................14 
MODERNITY............................................................................................................................................ 14 
SECULARISM ........................................................................................................................................... 16 
INDIAN SECULARISM............................................................................................................................... 18 
The Founding Fathers of Indian Secularism...................................................................................... 19 
The Constitution of India.................................................................................................................... 21 
Difficulties with Indian Secularism .................................................................................................... 23 
THE CONTEST OF SECULARISM..........................................................................25 
NATIONALISM ......................................................................................................................................... 25 
Approaches to Nationalism ................................................................................................................ 28 
COMMUNALISM ...................................................................................................................................... 33 
The Evolvement of Communal Identities............................................................................................ 36 
Economic Reasons.............................................................................................................................. 42 
Politicisation ...................................................................................................................................... 44 
HINDU NATIONALISM ............................................................................................................................. 46 
From a Cultural Organisation to a Mass Political Party .................................................................. 48 
The Ayodhya Case.............................................................................................................................. 54 
SIKH NATIONALISM ................................................................................................................................ 60 
The Way to a Sikh Identity.................................................................................................................. 60 
Operation Bluestar and the Assassination of Indira Gandhi ............................................................. 65 
Internal factors................................................................................................................................... 70 
Political Implications ......................................................................................................................... 72 
KASHMIRI NATIONALISM ........................................................................................................................ 74 
Kashmiri Identity................................................................................................................................ 74 
The Rise of Kashmiri Nationalism...................................................................................................... 75 
Territorial Dispute ............................................................................................................................. 77 
The Turn Against India ...................................................................................................................... 81 
Freedom Fighters............................................................................................................................... 83 
The Origins of the Unrest................................................................................................................... 85 
ASSESSMENT: THE CONTEST OF INDIAN SECULARISM ............................................................................ 87 
The Surrender of Secularism.............................................................................................................. 88 
Centralisation and Personalisation of Politics .................................................................................. 90 
The New Nationalism ......................................................................................................................... 92 
Unity Under Threat ............................................................................................................................ 93 
THE CRISIS OF INDIAN SECULARISM ................................................................94 
THE CRISIS IN NATION-BUILDING ........................................................................................................... 95 
The Unsuitability of Modernity .......................................................................................................... 95 
The Crisis of the Nation-State ............................................................................................................ 96 
THE ORGANIC CRISIS OF THE INDIAN STATE........................................................................................... 99 
The Decline of Indian Secularism .................................................................................................... 104 
The Nehru Tenure .........................................................................................................................................104 
Indira Gandhi’s Authoritarianism..................................................................................................................105 
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................109 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................112 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................................................. 112 
BOOKS, ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS ............................................................................................... 112 
 III
 
OTHER SOURCES ................................................................................................................................... 120 
Newspapers ...................................................................................................................................... 120 
Magazines ........................................................................................................................................ 120 
WWW-Documents............................................................................................................................. 121 
ANNEX I: THE MAP OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR............................................123 
ANNEX II: HINDU-MUSLIM RIOTS: VICTIMS .................................................124 
ANNEX III: FREQUENCY AND CASUALTIES OF COMMUNALIST 
INCIDENTS ................................................................................................................125 
 1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Three coaches of a train carrying devotees belonging to the Hindu community back 
home from a place of pilgrimage in Ayodhya, Northern India, were burnt down by a 
mob from the Muslim community on the 27th of February 2002, in which 57 people, 
including women and children, were burnt alive and charred to death.1 The attack could 
be seen as an act of revenge against the holy and disputed site in Ayodhya and against 
the expanse of Hindutva. This attack was followed by the second largest communalist 
riots2 in the country since the beginning of the 1990s. The Hindu nationalists wanted to 
start the construction for the temple for God Ram, which had been pulled down during 
the Muslim era. Until 1992, on the place stood the Babri Mosque, but the Hindus 
demolished it.  
 
The Hindu nationalist organisations were able to continue their agitation in the state of 
Gujarat, while the government of India was not able to respond to the riots quickly 
enough. The organisations circulated flyers which demanded people to boycott Muslim 
shops and not to watch movies whose protagonists were Muslims!3 Some suspects that 
there was no interest on the side of government to respond and has let the rioting 
continue. The opposition and several intellectuals have demanded that the Chief 
Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, and the Union Home Minister, L. K. Advani, 
resign. The Prime Minister of India has also got a share of the criticism.4 The violence 
in Gujarat has been referred to as the genocide and pogrom of Muslims,5 and low-scale 
rioting still continues.  
 
The Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has shifted to promote the 
Hindutva message through the fight against terrorism, by claiming that the Muslims are 
                                                          
1
 International Herald Tribune, February 28, 2002, frontpage ’57 die in train inferno in India’. Hindustan 
Times, February 28, 2002, The Week March 10 2002, 32-34, India Today March 10 2002, 30-32. 
2
 The rising death toll can be followed from the Hindustan Times March 1-5, 17, April 1, 3, 6, 17, 2002. 
3
 Hindustan Times, March 5, 2002 ‘And now, a set of riots vows’. 
4
 Hindustan Times, March 12, 2002 ‘Advani refuses to quit over Gujarat’. Hindustan Times, March 26, 
2002 ‘Gujarat rioters did it by the book’. Hindustan Times April 2, 2002, front-page ‘NHRC raps Modi 
for not stopping riots’. Varadarajan Siddharth, The Mask is Off. A Tale of Two Hindus. In The Times of 
India April 19, 2002, 14. 
5
 The Times of India, April 17, 2002 ‘Violence in Gujarat areas was a genocide, says women’s panel’. 
Indian Express, April 24, 2002, ‘A word called ‘genocide’’. 
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terrorists.6 Prime Minister Vajpayee (the BJP) took a strident pro-Hindutva line at a 
public rally. He claimed that Islamic terrorism and not Hindu extremism was the real 
danger to India and the world7 and accused Muslims of lighting the fire.8 Vajpayee also 
blamed the European Union and the USA for their involvement in India’s internal 
affairs after they had expressed concerns about the violence in Gujarat, by saying that 
India does not need any lessons in secularism from the West.9 The Chief Minister of 
Gujarat, who is also of the BJP, posed the Muslim attackers in Godhra as terrorist 
supported by Pakistan.10  
 
After the storming in Gujarat the situation has heated up in Jammu and Kashmir as well. 
In the late spring in 2002, the attacks in Kashmir became more frequent, as the state 
elections were coming closer. So far, the Kashmiri separatists groups have been against 
participation in the elections because that would legitimise the rule of India in Jammu 
and Kashmir. However, some groups have got tired of the constant violence and have 
considered participation as a solution to the dead-end situation. The issue of 
participation caused division among the separatist groups and as a consequence a 
moderate leader of a major separatist party11 was shot. The situation suddenly got worse 
after a terrorist attack on an Indian army camp, and the diplomatic relations between 
India and Pakistan broke down. The international community reacted quickly and tried 
to moderate between the quarrelmongers, but without any success. The situation was 
close to a nuclear war, as both of the countries are equipped with nuclear weapons.  
 
These recent developments show that communalism is still a very ‘hot’ and pending 
issue in India. For the last six years, India’s political landscape has been characterised 
by political fragmentation and the rise of caste and regional interests, and no national 
party has managed to command a majority on its own. India’s current Hindu nationalist 
government is the fifth government in two years, with the BJP depending on the support 
of 19 other parties, some with a primarily regional focus, to form the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA).  
                                                          
6
 The Times of India, March 21, 2002, front-page ‘Advani asks RSS to look for a new Hindutva agenda’. 
Kang Bhavdeep, Act II: Haws have landed. In Outlook, April 8th 2002, 34. 
7Vohra, Pankaj, BJP conveys one message to its cadres and another to allies. In Hindustan Times, April 
21, 2002, 3. 
8
 The Economist, April 20, 2002, 29. 
9
 The Times of India, April 26, 2002, front-page ‘PM tells West: Save your sermons’.  
10
 Hindustan Times, March 24, 2002, 14 ‘POTO: BJP stoops to conquer’. 
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Presentation of the topic 
 
After a long struggle against Britain’s colonial rule, the Indian subcontinent was divided 
into two states, India and Pakistan, in 1947. Pakistan portrayed itself as a state of a 
homogenous people whereas India proclaimed a pluralistic nationalism that welcomed 
religious and cultural diversity. At the time of the partition there were 361 million 
people living within India’s borders; of these people 315 million were Hindus, 32 
million Muslims, 7 million Christians, 6 million Sikhs, one million Buddhists, 100 000 
Parsians and a small minority of Jews.12 Exactly because of the multi-ethnicity India 
opted for secularism, which was considered vital for the existence of the Indian state. 
Secularism was supposed to solve the problem of religious and ethnic pluralism by 
uniting India. Secularism derived from the idea of modernity. It was connected to the 
nation-building and development of the new and modern India, and it was supposed to 
give a basis for a new identity for Indians. A modern, secular Indianness would replace 
the traditional, old-fashioned religious identities.  
 
The father of Indian secularism, Jawaharlal Nehru, with the Congress Party of India, 
developed a strategy of containment by which he meant that there should be a distance 
between the state and the religious passions of society. But to make a difference to the 
Western secularism this was interpreted so that all religions are entitled to flourish in 
India equally. The state of India has the demands and will lean on its mantra that India 
will stay united: ‘unity in diversity’. In spite of this equality, secularism has faced 
opposition from both outside and inside of India’s territory. The threat from outside has 
come from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the threat from inside from the 
different religiously motivated ethnic groups, such as Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, and 
from some of India’s territories, such as my example, Kashmir. These groups and areas 
threaten secularism and federalism by their secessionist or separatist aspirations. The 
aspirations are partly religious, partly disguised in a religious form, but they also affect 
the political, economic, social and cultural situation in the areas.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11
 Abdul Ghani Lone of the Hurriyat Conference. 
12
 The figures from: Stukenberg Marla, Der Sikh-Konflikt: Eine Fallstudie zur Politisierung ethnischer 
Indetität. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1995, 1. 
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Communalist incidents and the number of people injured in these indidents have 
increased in India since the 1960s13 and, at the same time, benefited the decay of 
secularism in India. To explain this I discuss more in detail two main communalist 
incidents and a dispute that have taken place during the independence of India. The first 
is the demolition of the Babri-mosque in the town of Ayodhya in 1992, done by Hindu 
nationalists who claimed that the mosque was built on the birthplace of Hindu God 
Ram. The second is Operation Bluestar, an attack initiated by Indira Gandhi on the Sikh 
temple in Amritsar in 1984. My third example is the dispute of Kashmir and especially 
the malfuction of democracy there as the cause of the uprising. The Kashmiri 
nationalists consider their fight against the Indian rule justified because India has 
gradually diminished the autonomy in their state. Therefore they want to secede from 
the Indian Union. India does not want to guarantee independence to Jammu and 
Kashmir because it takes the state for an essential part of the Indian Union. There are 
also various other confrontations that contest secularism,14 but I leave those out as 
unnecessary because their essence is not so much communalist. 
 
I chose this topic because of my long interest in the history of the former colonial 
countries and politics of India and the interest in the history after the second world war. 
India presents one of the most colourful histories of these countries and its importance 
is now growing because it is a big country with nuclear-weapons. I find it important to 
keep track of what is happening in the country because of its unstable politics and the 
hatred that prevails in the country against minorities. Kashmir is also nowadays 
mentioned as one of the most likely places on earth for a nuclear war. To be able to find 
a solution and follow the developments in Kashmir, it is also important to understand 
the history and its underpinnings.  
 
When I started my studies I found it useful to specialise in some area, for me it was 
South Asia. Through the specialisation I hope to in get a comprehensive outlook on the 
South Asian history and politics and to be able to continue to research the topic after my 
graduation as well. I have also familiarised myself with the development questions of 
India in my development studies and during internships both in India and Finland. I 
                                                          
13
 Two tables as annexes. The other presents the official numbers provided by the Indian government and 
the other one presents the figures estimated by some observers. 
14
 For example in Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Darjeeling, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. 
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came to the topic of this thesis through my Bachelor’s thesis in which I studied the 
Hindu nationalist movement. I found it amazing that this gigantic territory-state has 
stayed united for more than 50 years in spite of the ethnic plurality. Particularly, 
because several states in Asia as in Europe have fallen into pieces. In the beginning I 
also found the idea of having secularism as a blueprint in India fascinating. Mahatma 
Gandhi skilfully united the people in the 1920s and 1930s with his campaign against the 
colonial rule. He understood the totalising meaning of religion for the Indian people and 
tried to integrate the religions of India to the nationalist movement. Jawaharlal Nehru, 
the first Prime Minister of India, wanted to create secularism on the foundation that 
Gandhi had made, but he saw that the unity would be more stable if religious feelings 
were confined to be outside of the political life. 
Aims  
 
In this thesis I argue that the religiously-oriented nationalisms of India have contested 
Indian secularism which has led to the crisis of secularism and to the failure of the 
Indian nation-state. Thus my aim is to demonstrate how Indian secularism has been 
contested by communalist powers that function inside India. The contest and the 
position that the communalist movements have gained in India has made it difficult for 
the secularism to serve as the ideology of the state. This is important for understanding 
the state in which India finds itself today and for understanding the politics of India in 
the twentyfirst century. My aim is to study the way the nationalisms have been able to 
contest the secularism; which still remains a constitutional principal of the unity of 
India. To do this, I examine the political development of the nationalisms and their 
conjuncture with the Indian politics led by the advocate of secularism, the Congress 
Party. I also examine why the separatist nationalisms turned against the nation-building 
project of India and started to demand the recognition of their own nations. The contest 
has evolved during several decades and therefore the timeframe of this thesis is also 
long. In spite of this, I aim at a comprehensive picture of the contest which necessarily 
includes studying the political field of India up to today. All the nationalisms have been 
confined to discuss the time until the beginning of 1990s because an important change 
took place at that time in the Indian political field: the Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya 
Janata Party won the parliamentary elections on the federal level and became a 
significant challenger of the Congress. My emphasis is more on the contest and how it 
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evolved than on the failure and the decay of secularism. I naturally explain the 
developments of Sikh, Hindu and Kashmiri nationalisms to clarify how they have 
contested secularism. 
 
As the challengers of the Indian secularism I examine Hindu nationalism, Sikh 
nationalism and Kashmiri nationalism. They represent different forms of nationalism, 
but in the framework of secularism they all lead to the same consequence: the decay of 
secularism. These nationalisms have been the three most powerful nationalisms in India. 
Hindu nationalism is majoritarian nationalism and thus its aim is not to secede but to 
convert India to a Hindu state. Sikhs, on the other hand, are a minority who at first 
wanted autonomy for their territory and after having achieved this started to demand 
independence. The problems in Kashmir, then, started as a territorial dispute between 
India and Pakistan but after the mid-1980s it evolved into a Kashmiri nationalist 
movement demanding for the autonomy that had been granted already in 1948 but was 
never put into practice. Today the Kashmiri nationalists also dream of independence. 
Both Pakistan and India still claim that Kashmir is an essential part of their territory and 
nation-state. Therefore, independence is not considered an option. 
 
I have confined the topic on Northern India, because communalism is more 
concentrated there. Both Punjab and Kashmir, which are situated in North India, are two 
of the main challengers of Indian secularism. Hindu nationalism, on the other hand, is 
concentrated in the North, as it is the Hindi speaking area of India. I will not focus on 
the areas in Northeast and South India even though they also partly contest secularism. 
In these areas the reasons for contest are more linguistic than communal. In the federal 
state of Assam, for example, the agitation unites all speakers of the Assamese language, 
whether Hindus, Muslims or tribal people. The threat there comes not from another 
religion but from another language and culture.15 The Assamese have lost large areas of 
their former state for the formation of new tribal states like Nagaland, Arunachal 
Pradesh and Meghalaya, and now they see themselves as likely to be outnumbered and 
out-bought in their own homelands, as well as inadequately recompensed for the 
contribution that their products, such as oil and tea, make to the national income.16 My 
                                                          
15
 Jeffrey Robin, What’s Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, Mrs Gandhi’s Death and the Test 
for Federalism. Macmillan Press Ltd, Hampshire and London 1986, 7-8. 
16
 Morris-Jones W. H., India –More Questions than Answers. In Asian Survey Vol. XXIV, No. 8, August 
1984, 811.   
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focus is only on the contest done inside of India. Therefore I have left out the role of 
Pakistan, even though I discuss it when it is necessary for the matter in question, 
especially in the case of Kashmir. 
  
I have divided this thesis into three main chapters: Secularism, Contest of Secularism 
and Crisis of Secularism. In the first part, I study the concept of secularism and how it 
derives from the framework of the modern idea of nationalism and development. On my 
opinion, Indian secularism is a product of this reasoning. This gives then a background 
for understanding the contest of secularism. In the second part, I look at the evolvement 
of communalism and try to shed some light on how a communal identity develops. 
Then, I examine the conflict between secularism and communalism which has resulted 
in the contest of secularism by Hindu, Sikh and Kashmiri nationalisms. As the defender 
of secularism I see the Congress Party, because it is the loudest and most noteworthy 
advocate of secularism in India. I explain also the inner evolvement of the nationalisms 
and their conjuncture with the decay of secularism. In the third part, I discuss the 
internal causes of the crisis. For this purpose I look at the political development of India 
and use two theories to explain the failure of secularism. At the end I put the contest of 
Indian secularism in the wider framework of the history of the independent India.  
Sources and Literature 
 
The main sources of my thesis are researches in Indian history. I have used books by 
Indian scholars quite a bit, as I think that it is fruitful to be familiar with the views of 
both Western scholars and “domestic” Indian scholars. Indian society is very complex 
and therefore these researchers might have very different ways to explain and interpret 
the history of India. Indian research is also widely recognised for its high quality, but 
unfortunately only a fraction of the research is published in Europe. For me problematic 
in reading the works of Indian scholars was that it took me a long time before I noticed 
whether behind the opinion of the researcher lies a nationalist conviction, for example 
Hindu nationalism. I have worked on my thesis for almost two years and during these 
years I have read at least one hundred books written on the topic. I have familiarised 
myself with the leading Indian scholars like Partha Chatterjee, Ashis Nandy and K. N. 
Panikkar but also with less famous researchers. How much of the research literature I 
have been able to cover, is hard to say. In my opinion, I have covered most of the point 
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of views that exist on the study of the crisis of Indian secularism, though some of those 
I have left out from the thesis as unnecessary17. 
 
I was entitled to write the thesis in Berlin and Kiel and use the excellent libraries of the 
universities of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu 
Kiel. Without this possibility the topic of my thesis would have needed to be different. 
The variety of books on South Asian history and politics for this topic would have been 
too restricted in Finland. I read several Indian newspapers and articles about the topic 
during my three-month-stay as an intern in New Delhi. This has clarified many of my 
unanswered questions and brought me up-to-date on the issue. 
 
Most of the first hand sources were beyond my reach because they are in India. 
Therefore my sources are basically all secondary. However, there are some books that 
serve both as primary sources and secondary sources. The books are primary sources 
when I examine the discussion on the topic and secondary sources when I present facts 
about the topic. The archive material is from the archives of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Finland. I studied the files on Kashmir and Indian domestic politics during the 
years 1951-1977. The reports from the Embassy kept repeating the same very often, 
probably because of the changes in the personnel; every new person that came to town 
wrote an analysis on the situation, including a short history of India, maybe more for 
clearing the situation for himself than for the Ministry. I hoped to find more information 
on the contracts made by India and Pakistan on the situation in Kashmir, but these had 
been left without any the observance of the diplomats.  
 
I also read the Lok Sabha18 Debates from December 1992 concerning the demolition of 
a mosque in the town of Ayodhya, and from July 1984 concerning Operation Bluestar 
that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi started to restrain the rise of Sikh militants. 
Unfortunately the Finnish Parliament library did not have the debates from early June 
1984 or November 1984 which would have been more useful for me. The Debate 
reports were quite difficult to interpret as they only mentioned from which part of India 
the speaker came from but not the party that the speaker represented. I read The Times 
                                                          
17There is for example a discussion going on in the legal field about the role of secularism as the 
constitutional principal. According to this discussion secularism is not in crisis, as the constitution is not 
threathened. I find this argument too formal, as the crisis can also happen on the political level. 
18
 The Lok Sabha (House of the People) is the lower house and the supreme legislative body in India. 
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and Helsingin Sanomat newspapers from June 1984, November 1984 and December 
1992, and looked for information on the course of events during the attacks on the 
Golden Temple and the Babri Masjid. I also examined the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Indira Gandhi and the web sites of those political parties that I studied in this thesis.  
 
There is some research done on this topic already, but from a historical point of view, 
only little. The studies also concentrate more on the crisis of secularism than on the 
contest. The crisis of secularism has been examined from the perspective of political 
science, from a sociological point of view and from the field of religion. I think that one 
of the tasks of science is also to structuralise and categorise information and concentrate 
on the discussion on the topic. This way the researcher can find new aspects that have 
not been realised before and present the information in a more logical and 
comprehensive manner. My benefit to the study of the crisis of Indian secularism is that 
I compare the different nationalisms, which no one else, to my knowledge, has done 
before. Because od this new approach the emphasis in this research is not on one 
singular nationalism but on a broader perspective of the Indian state and how the 
nationalisms have been able to contest it. Therefore I am not studing the separatist 
nationalisms as such and presenting new interpretations of the nationalisms. By doing 
this, I aim at a more comprehensive picture than the former research on the series of 
events leading to the contest of secularism and on the fact that the contest is a 
phenomenon that goes through the Indian society. The facts have been presented 
already many times by different authors, but I have managed to fill up some gaps and to 
answer the questions that rose from the literature. To study the three nationalisms in one 
thesis is a wide area to cover, but I argue that it gives a more coherent picture of the 
Indian politics than the research where only one or two contesting nationalisms are 
discussed. 
 
Partha Chatterjee is one of the leading political scientists studying Indian political 
history. In his book Nation and Its Fragments he criticises the state-centred ideas of 
nationalism by taking examples from old Indian texts, such as fairytales, poems and 
myths. He pays special attention to history of Bengal, because it was the area where 
nationalism raised its head first in India. Chatterjee’s emphasis in intrepreting the 
colonial history of the roots of nationalism in India. My point of view on Indian history 
does not lie in the colonial time but in the time of independence. Therefore, Chatterjee 
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cannot be one of my main sources. The book Locked Minds, Modern Myths by T. N. 
Madan is a sociological study on the crisis of Indian secularism and the rise of 
fundamentalism. Madan sees religious behaviour as a reason for the rise of 
fundamentalism which has then caused the decline of secularism. The idea in my thesis 
is the same, but the field under examination is different; I do not put emphasis on 
religion but on politics and history. My other main sources are Sumantra Bose’s Hindu 
Nationalism and the Crisis of the Indian State, Sudipta Kaviraj’s Crisis of the Nation-
State in India and the book Creating a Nationality from Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedy, 
Shail Mayaram and Achyut Yagnik. These books and articles helped me to understand 
the character of the crisis and introduced me to the theoretical background on the topic. 
 
For the theoretical background I use the researches by Juan Linz and Antonio Gramsci. 
It is not very typical to attach them to the context of India. I did this because their 
theories present an excellent framework for the crisis of the Indian state. I also have a 
short look on the wide field of the study of nationalism. There, under my examination 
are Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Anthony D. Smith. I base my conception of 
the idea of nationalism on the definition of Anderson. I also interpret all the 
nationalisms discussed in this thesis according to Anderson’s definition. 
 
Hindu nationalism is the most researched of the three nationalisms but most of the 
research has been done on the nationalism, not on the connections between the Hindu 
nationalists and Indian secularism. I divide the academic work concerning Hindu 
nationalism into two groups. The first strand revolves around the political role and the 
newly gained dominant position of Hindu nationalism. It is seen as the result of decades 
of systematic work and good political strategies. My main source, Christophe Jaffrelot, 
falls under this category. The second group interprets Hindu nationalism in cultural and 
historical terms. These researchers19 see Hindu nationalism more in religious terms: 
they emphasise the historical roots of Hinduism and the central role of the Hindus in 
Indian nationalism.  
 
Sikh nationalism has got the least attention of scholars and the research is mostly 
describing historiography. An example of this is Khushwant Singh’s History of the 
Sikhs, which describes the events very precisely from the times of Guru Nanak to the 
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year 1988. Singh, who is a Sikh himself, introduces an orthodox version of the Sikh 
historiography which can be interpreted as the history of the Sikh faith. Sometimes his 
argumentation does not meet all requirements of scientific research. A good and 
thorough research on the development of the Sikh identity has been done by Rajiv A. 
Kapur. He concentrates more on the beginning of the twentieth century. A German 
researcher and one of the few Western women who have studied the history and politics 
of India, Marla Stukenberg has studied the Sikh conflict. Her sources are manifold; she 
has interviewed strategists of the conflict, terrorists and those who suffered from the 
conflict, but the officials of the central government she has left out without stating a 
reason. Stukenberg has also studied the rhetoric of Sikh leaders. These have all 
apparently helped her to get a thorough picture of the Sikh community. Several articles 
in Asian Survey have cleared up the dimensions of the Punjab crisis for me. 
 
The research on Kashmir is highly concentrated on the political relationships of 
superpowers and the perspectives of India and Pakistan in the conflict. This point of 
view is definitely very interesting, with its implications on the one hand on the Cold 
War and on the other hand on non-alignment politics. The focus, especially in the 
studies of Alastair Lamb and Robert Wirsing, has strongly been on the turning-points 
and in the reasons why the wars in Kashmir flared up. But the opinion of the Kashmiris 
on their own destiny is totally missing, as well as the effects of the wars and the 
competition between the states on the Kashmiri people. Even though the possession of 
Kashmir is a matter of life and death to India, according to its own argumentation, it has 
not been the focus of any research so far. The research does not analyse but tell the 
history, just like Leopold von Ranke had described ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen ist’. My 
main source on the Kashmir question is the doctorate of Sten Widmalm, Democracy 
and Violent Separatism in India: Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective. The doctorate 
revolves around the question of Jammu and Kashmir without putting it into the wider 
Indian context. Widmalm knows very well the separatist movements in Kashmir and the 
development of democracy in the state. He as well as other scholars use the concept of 
Kashmiri identity without explaining properly what they mean by it.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
19K. N. Panikkar could fall into this category. 
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Concepts 
 
Secularism, nationalism and communalism are the main concepts, all of which I also 
discuss later. Secularism and nationalism are of Western origin and therefore it is hard 
to apply them to the Indian context. Communalism, on the other hand, is more an Indian 
phenonmenon. Though, in India is has widely been limited to mean religious 
nationalism and religious fanatisism. I have explained in the corresponding chapters the 
difficulties in applying the concepts, but I need to rely on the Western concepts as there 
are not any responding ones and also Indian scholars have made the same remark. 
Therefore, I use definitions which I find the most appropriate to the Indian context.  
 
Shortly, with secularism I mean that religion and politics should be kept in different 
spheres in society, religion in the private sphere and politics in the public. Indian 
secularism, on the other hand, means that this division is not that strict but the state is 
allowed to support religions equally. According to T. N. Madan, secularisation 
ordinarily refers to the socio-cultural processes that enlarge the areas of life, such as 
material, institutional and intellectual, in which the role of the sacred is progressively 
limited. Secularity, then, is the resultant of this process, and secularism is the ideology 
that argues for the historical inevitability and progressive nature of secularisation 
everywhere.20   
 
Nationalism, then, is in broad terms the feeling of unity among a group of people which 
leads them to strive for a political unit. I examine different nationalisms in India which 
should not be mixed with Indian nationalism, as it refers to the nationalism that rose 
against colonialism and whose supporters were adherents of the common Indian identity 
‘Indianness’. Indian nationalism was secular and its leaders were Mohandas ‘Mahatma’ 
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The Indianness was one of the main ideas of the 
Congress Party. Hindu, Sikh and Kashmiri nationalisms, here referred to as the other 
nationalisms in India, oppose the Indian nationalism and its attempts to unify and 
homogenise the different communities in India, but they also oppose each other, as they 
assume that the other ones threat their position. 
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Communalism is the political dimension of nationalism. Communalism is not based on 
the feeling of a distinct nation but of a smaller unity, community. In this thesis 
communalism refers to the desire to protect this distinct community from others. 
Religion often lies behind communalist action and in the case of India the communalists 
use religious feeling of the people as the means of mobilisation. A common character 
that all the communalisms, that I discuss here, share is the fear of the threatening 
‘Other’. For Hindus it is the Muslims, for Sikhs the Hindus and for Kashmiris the Sikhs 
and the Hindus. All of them see Indian secularism as a threatening force that needs to be 
fought against. 
   
The contest of Indian secularism means that Hindu, Sikh and Kashmiri nationalisms try 
to brake the secular central power of India by separating from the Indian Union. The 
separation has political, economic and social but also religious dimensions. This, then, 
has led to the crisis of Indian secularism. Indian central powers have not been able to 
solve the conflicts by negotiation but have needed to rely on violence and armed forces. 
They have also succumbed to use religion for their political purposes. Indira Gandhi, for 
example, has made an appearance as a supporter of the Hindu religion in Kashmir to 
gain the votes of the Hindus and win the Muslim party21.    
 
The main religions that are discussed in the thesis are Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam. 
Shortly, Hinduism is a religion which actually consist of many different religions. It 
bases on several different deities and on the idea of rebirth. A Hindu tries through good 
deeds in the present life to get a better life in the next one. Sikhism, on the other hand, 
has only one god, but gurus are worshipped as well. However, Sikhism derives from 
Hinduism and therefore the Sikh and Hindu identities can sometimes be overlapping. 
Islam is a religion, which is based on the concept of one god and the law system of 
Sharia. Islam is, generally said, a holistic lifestyle for its adherents which also makes it 
a major political player. For this thesis the concept of jihad has some relevance. Jihad 
means a justified war in the name of Islam. It is for defending Islam and Muslims, but it 
does not necessarily have to be limited to defence. There are fighters in Jammu and 
Kashmir that fight in the name of god, claiming that their fight si based on the concept 
of Jihad. 
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SECULARISM 
Modernity 
 
Secularism, democracy, nationalism and nation-state derive from the changes that took 
place in eighteenth century Europe. They are products of the ideals of Modernity,22 
which changed the relations of power in society by the transformation of frontiers into 
borders23, the rise of the bourgeoisie and the new role of rulers which was characterised 
by a fundamental change in the relation between the rulers and the ruled. Modernity was 
considered to be applicable universally and the idea was brought to the colonies by the 
colonial power and the colonial elite that had been educated in the colonial power, in the 
case of India in Great Britain. Before the eighteenth century, the right to rule was 
legitimated by the belief that legitimacy came from above, rather than from the ruled. A 
radical shift occurred as a consequence of the spread of the new ideas emphasising 
liberty, equality and particularly the idea of state power rooted in popular consent.24 The 
Enlightenment changed the structure of the state to a more centralised one and the role 
of the state strengthened. The voyages of exploration and colonialism which provided 
information on other cultures and the possibility to compare Europe with the new areas 
and study both of them critically.  
 
The modern concept of popular sovereignty was designed for the ‘whole people’, even 
though in the first instance it was assumed that the most educated and enlightened 
citizens would guide the people and bring them gradually into political life. The 
principal of sovereignty resided essentially in the nation, which in practice meant the 
demand for national self-determination.25 Modernity eroded the local structures by 
transforming the economic life and giving an impetus to greater mobility. It introduced 
industrial societies which were organised around territorial nation-states, often 
promoting a liberal conception of individual citizenship. Education and literacy were 
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considered to be the responsibilities of the state, not of the church as it was before. 
Industrialisation was expected to lead to capitalism and mass-consumption, which both 
were aimed at increasing the welfare of the nation.26 Modernity bears a particularly 
intimate historical connection with nationalism because a national community was an 
identity unavailable in earlier political imagination. 27 
 
The idea of modernity made it seem like the colonial rule impeded further development 
in colonised countries: colonial rule had become a historical fetter that had to be 
removed and an own nation was to replace it. After the formerly colonised countries had 
gained independence they had a territorial state, but they lacked a politically constituted 
‘nation’, which needed to be constructed or imagined for this purpose. This nation was 
then to lead the development of the country. Despite its internal complexity, the Indian 
national movement imagined of a constructed modern Indian nation. Most nationalist 
politicians were found of the narratives of western modernity, for example democracy, 
secularism and social justice. I concentrate only on the contest done inside of India. 
Therefore I have confined the role of Pakistan out even though I discuss the role of 
Pakistan when it is necessary for the matter in question, especially in the case of 
Kashmir. However, some aspects of the trajectory of European nationalism could not be 
replicated under Indian conditions. If the nation-state had to be culturally homogeneous 
by definition, it did not fit the cultural reality of the Indian subcontinent.28  
 
The nationalist leaders were convinced that the absence of a proper nation-state and 
proper nationalist sentiments were major gaps in Indian society and showed how 
backward it was. For the nation-building process, the Congress appointed a Committee 
of Experts in the beginning of the 1940s to consider urgent and vital solutions to the 
problems occurring in the scheme of national reconstruction and social planning. The 
aims of the Committee were the national integration of a diverse mosaic of groups, 
communities and societies; economic development of a country that had suffered from 
colonialism for 200 years; social equality in a land that was dominated by myriad forms 
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of entrenched inequality; and consolidation of multi-party political democracy.29 The 
planning of the nation-state had to be a way of avoiding the unnecessary setbacks of an 
industrial transition in so far as it affected the masses in India’s villages. On the other 
hand, planning was to become a positive instrument for resolving conflicts in a large 
and heterogeneous subcontinent.30  
 
Modernity also paved the way for the idea of secularism. In the time of Enlightenment 
states shifted from the rule of the Church to the rule of a secular ruler. The aims of the 
shift were better rights for the citizens: democracy, liberal rights, parliamentary system. 
Secularism limited the rights of the Church to interfere in issues concerning governing. 
A secular state is then the opposite of a religiously governed state. 
Secularism  
 
The English word ‘secular’ comes from the Latin ‘saeculum’, which means ‘an age’ or 
‘the spirit of an age’. It has the same meaning as the Greek ‘aeon’, which is used in the 
New Testament for an ‘age’ or ‘era’.31 The conflict between religious faith and human 
reason, which forms part of  the background to the emergence of the modern ideology 
of secularism, surfaced in the late Middle Ages.32 Historically secularism as an 
orientation to the world is linked to two major interrelated processes in Europe. There 
were some theological developments within Protestantism that legitimated scientific 
investigations as a search for laws of nature that God had instituted; however, the 
scientific activity gained its own internal autonomy and legitimacy among the 
practitioners without the role of God in the work. The second stream that led into 
secularism was the dominance achieved in European thought from the seventeenth 
century onwards by Enlightenment rationalism.33 This change began in Europe at the 
end of the Thirty Years’ War when the church properties started to be transferred to the 
exclusive control of the princes. This statement became after the French Revolution a 
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value statement as well: in 1789, French statesman Charles Maurice de Talleyrand 
announced to the French National Assembly that all ecclesiastical goods were at the 
disposal of the nation, as they should have been. The term ‘secularism’ was coined in 
1851 in England and the secularisation was built into the ideology of progress.34 
Nowadays the term secularisation is generally employed to refer to the process by 
which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious 
institutions and symbols35 as religion is considered to be an open or potential threat to 
modern polity.36  
 
An Indian political scientist, Partha Chatterjee, has defined three principles as the 
characteristics of a secular state. The first is the principle of liberty, which requires that 
the state permit the practice of any religion, within the limits set by certain other basic 
rights which the state is also required to protect. The second is the principle of equality, 
which requires that the state does not give preference to any religion over another. The 
third is the principle of neutrality that is best described as the requirement that the state 
does not give preference to the religious over the non-religious and which leads, in 
combination with the liberty and equality principles, to what is known in the 
constitutional law of the United States of America as the ‘wall of separation’ doctrine: 
namely, that the state does not involve itself with religious affairs or organisations.37 
Basically the same principles have been defined by D. E. Smith as well.38  
 
A short examination of the Constitution of United States of America points out that 
these principles are included in the First Amendment to the Constitution. The first is 
‘non-interference’, meaning that the state or the government shall not establish a church, 
and the second is ‘entitlement’, meaning that the citizen has the right to follow a 
religion of his or her choice, or none at all.39 In the USA the Congress cannot make any 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, 
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meaning that both religion and government can best work to achieve their aims if each 
is left free of the other within its respective sphere.40 In spite of the fact that the US has 
been a secular country since 1787, the Supreme Court did not hold until 1947 that the 
government must be neutral toward religion.41 Only from 1947 on government grants of 
money to religious institutions were prohibited.42  
Indian Secularism 
 
India will be a land of many faiths, equally honoured and respected, but of 
one national outlook. 
  Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 January 1948  
 
The British colonial rule evolved a policy of religious neutrality in their colonies in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The British tried to stay neutral on the disputes 
over religion, and were particularly careful not to be seen as promoting Christianity. 
After the assumption of power in India by the British Crown in 1858, a significant step 
was taken in instituting equality before the law by enacting uniform codes of civil and 
criminal law. The area left out was personal law, which continued to be governed by the 
respective religious laws as recognised and interpreted by the courts. The reason why 
personal law was not brought to the scope of a uniform civil code was the reluctance of 
the colonial state to intervene in matters close to the very heart of religious doctrine and 
practice.43 However, there were various kinds of involvement in religious affairs that 
produced a somewhat confused interpretation of this phase. During certain periods, 
grants of money were given by the British government for the support of Hindu temples 
and Muslim mosques, and Christian missionaries were actively discouraged. Later, 
under other officials, missionary work was vigorously promoted. In general, the 
administration still remained fair, impartial and secular, and by the end of the nineteenth 
century most educated Indians would have been willing to concede that. Generally the 
aspect of the principle of religious neutrality was being faithfully adhered.44   
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The Founding Fathers of Indian Secularism 
Mahatma Gandhi has on his own part benefited the evolvement of the concept of 
secularism by clarifying the relationship between state and religion. Gandhi actually 
rejected the ideology of secularism without any qualifications, but interestingly and 
consistently advocated for a secular state completely detached from the religious 
concerns of the people.45 At the same time, Mahatma Gandhi emphasised the 
inseparability of religion and politics and the superiority of the former over the latter. 
He has written that ‘those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not 
know what religion means.’46 For Gandhi religion was the source of absolute value and 
hence constitutive of social life and that is why politics were the arena of public interest. 
The inseparability of religion and politics in the Indian context was for Gandhi a 
fundamentally distinct issue from the separation of the state from the church in 
Christendom. When he did advocate that religion and state should be separate, he 
clarified that this was to limit the role of the state to secular welfare and to allow it no 
admittance into the religious life of the people.47 Gandhi died because he had striven 
unceasingly to promote Hindu-Muslim unity. There were competing nationalists 
discourses in India in the beginning of the twentieth century but Gandhi had tried to 
combine these under the aim of “swaraj” (self-rule). 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru was the main architect in the relation between the state and religion in 
India. While Gandhi put his faith in the reformed, ethnically refined individual, in 
creating a better if not the ideal society, Nehru considered the shaping of suitable 
institutions as the best means of achieving the same goal. Of all the modern institutions, 
it was the state which he believed would be the principal engine of social change. The 
ideal state according to Nehru was first and foremost democratic, but also socialist 
because of its bad economic situation and secularist because of the cultural and religious 
diversity.48 An example from Nehru’s writings and speeches brings out very clearly his 
conviction that religion is a hindrance to the change and progress which are inherent in 
human society and that the belief in supernatural agency which ordains everything has 
led to a certain irresponsibility, and emotion and sentimentality have taken the place of 
                                                          
45
 Madan 1997, 36-7. 
46
 Gandhi M. K, An Autobiography or the Story of  My Experiments with Truth, Navjivan Publishing 
House, Ahmedabad 1940, 383, also Madan 1998, 305. 
47
 Madan 1998, 305. 
48
 Ibid., 310. 
 20
 
reasoned thought.49 He was influenced by the experience of European nations and 
Marxist thinking and believed that industrialisation would erode the influence of 
religion. Therefore, he did not worry too much about religion or its political expression, 
namely communalism, because he passionately believed that these phenomena would 
vanish at the touch of reality.50  In a letter from 1931 he insisted that, ‘the real thing to 
my mind is the economic factor. If we lay stress on this and divert public attention to it 
we shall find automatically that religious differences recede into the background and a 
common bond unites different groups. The economic bond is stronger than the national 
one.’51  
 
Nehru insisted that once a national state came into being it would be economic 
problems that would acquire salience; there might be class conflicts but not religious 
conflicts, except insofar as religion itself expressed some vested interests.52 Nehru was 
committed to the ideas of the Enlightenment and represents better than anybody else in 
India the predicament of modernity.53 Nehru has described the creation of a secular state 
in a religious society as the biggest problem that he had during his years in power. In 
1961, just three years before his death he wrote: “We talk about a secular state in India. 
It is perhaps not very easy even to find a good word in Hindi for ‘secular’. Some people 
think it means something opposed to religion. That obviously is not correct…It is a state 
which honours all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities.”54     
 
Even though Indian society at large was constituted by a diversity of cultures, 
languages, religions and customs, Nehru wanted it to become one nation in unity. Thus 
the secular state was a requirement in the project of nationhood, as it would guarantee 
the unity of India and further the identity of common ‘Indianness’. Secondly, the 
partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947, and the formation of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, nevertheless left within the boundaries of India a very 
considerable majority of Muslims. During the partition Muslims and Hindus killed each 
other without any hesitation, and if India had become for example a Hindu state, the 
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living conditions of Muslims in India would have been difficult to guarantee as positive. 
Nehru’s view on the state’s neutrality towards all religions does not give clear directives 
as to how this pragmatic and diplomatic view is to be implemented when disputes 
regarding differential claims on state support were demanded by different religious 
groups or when religious groups, collided over religious practices that allegedly violated 
their respective rights and their autonomies.55 Nehru admitted that before secularism can 
function in India, there needs to prevail a level of general education and a liberal 
outlook on life and scientific temper which unfortunately lack in India.56 
 
In sum, what was pursued by the founding fathers of Indian secularism was a separation 
of two realms in the public: one was the political realm, wherein the interest of national 
unity, nonpreference, and the rationalities and imperatives of the state compelled 
political actors to speak and act in certain ways, while at the same time praising the 
cultural diversity of India; the other was the cultural realm, wherein any community 
could celebrate itself and its own myths and exclude others. This cultural diversity was 
the foundation of the larger nation. However, the political realm was not supposed to be 
“contaminated” by unilateral celebration of one community or the open representation 
of particularist interests of a community.57  
The Constitution of India 
The British influence, experience with the workings of provincial autonomy and the 
popularity of federalism as a desirable political system for plural societies in the 20th 
century influenced the framers of federalism. The Constituent Assembly recommended 
a centralised federal model for India according to the ideals of the upper caste English-
educated supporters of the national movement. The Constitution of India gives far 
greater powers to the central government than for example the federal Constitution of 
the United States does. The central government in India can not only command and 
control states or provinces but also make their autonomy ineffective and dismiss their 
governments58 and replace them with administrations run directly from New Delhi. The 
president may declare an Emergency in a state if convinced that its government cannot 
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be conducted in accordance with the Constitution.59 This was meant to sustain national 
identity by giving power to the central government, which would then be responsible 
for educating the less educated rural masses on nationalism.60 The strong role of the 
central government has been a significant factor in shaping the history of independent 
India. 
 
In the Preamble to the Constitution,61 India has clearly been referred to as a sovereign 
socialist secular democratic republic that secures for all its citizens: social, economic 
and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of 
status and of opportunity; and promotes among them all fraternity assuring the dignity 
of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation.62 The problem is that the 
Constitution does not define accurately what is meant by a secular Indian state and how 
religion should be separated from politics and the state. The most common conception 
of how this should be done, has been formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru, but the definition 
does not have a legal basis.  
 
The Constitution of India also discusses the role of religion within the state. Religious 
rights were put into the Constitution as perceived solutions to the problems of religious 
turmoil which haunted pre-independence India and which led to the partition between 
India and Pakistan.63 The chapter on fundamental rights guarantees the minority groups 
that they and their interests could not be overridden in a majoritarian democracy. In part 
III on fundamental rights and the right to equility article 1564 prohibits the Indian state 
from discriminating any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. 
For some reason or other this article has not always been followed in India. For 
example, the Muslims of Kashmir claim that they have not been granted government 
posts because of their religion, and this is the same reason the Sikhs have given for the 
refusal of the Indian Army to give them military posts after the mid-1980s. The 
Constitution advances principles of secular democracy (article 292) by prohibiting 
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electoral reservations on the basis of religion and outlaws the establishment of a 
special electorate for Muslims (article 32).        
 
The All India Nationalist Forum and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), both Hindu 
nationalist organisations, seek to abolish two crucial articles of the Constitution that 
seem to give significant concessions to minorities or the minority-dominated state. For 
instance, Article 30 [1] permits religious and linguistic minorities to establish and run 
their own educational institutions, which the Forum believes to be against the interests 
of national unity. Similarly, Article 30 grants special status to the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir where Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority. According to the Forum, 
granting of such a status to a minority-dominated state will encourage other minorities 
to seek special status within the Indian union and eventually lead to an imbalance within 
the Indian union.65   
Difficulties with Indian Secularism 
The transferability of the idea of a nation-state based on secularism into multi-religious 
societies like India is beset with many difficulties. It should be realised that secularism 
cannot be restricted to rationalism, but it should be compatible with faith.66 The Indian 
version of secularism implies that while the public life may or may not be kept free of 
religion, it must have space for continuous dialogue between religious traditions and 
between religion and secularism.67 The state in independent India is officially secular as 
it is not allied with any particular religion or an instrument of any church. Yet, in 
practice the Indian state does not separate itself from religion, but tries to give a picture 
of itself as a neutral country by publicly recognising all religions and their social 
practices. Religious rituals, often with a preference for the Hindu, form a part of public 
functions held under the auspices of the state.68  
 
The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution and the Congress leadership were quite 
aware that it was necessary to avoid an overt politicisation of community identities. 
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Secularism was seen as the only possible option that would be able to provide 
harmonious living together for the different tribes and peoples of India. Unfortunately 
Indian understanding of secularism failed to provide a satisfactory relationship between 
state and religion and the founding fathers were not able to explain to the people in their 
own languages what was meant by secularism.69 
 
Partha Chatterjee claims that the application of the three constitutional characteristics of 
a secular state to the situation in India has led to major anomalies. These anomalies can 
be said to be the special features of Indian secularism. The first principle, that is, a right 
to freedom of religion, gives to every citizen not only ‘the equal right to freedom of 
conscience but also the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion’. 
However, the state has the right to regulate ‘any economic, financial, political or other 
secular activity which may be associated with religious practice’ to provide for social 
welfare and reform to all sections.70  
 
The second principle, equality, prohibits the state from discriminating against any 
citizen solely on the basis of religion or caste, except when it makes special provisions 
for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes or for scheduled 
tribes. Such special quotas in employment and education, or reserved seats in 
representative bodies, have of course led to much controversy in India in last few 
decades. These quotas can be seen as positive discrimination in favour of scheduled 
castes: in order to qualify as a member of a scheduled caste, a person must profess 
either Hindu or Sikh religion; a public declaration of the adoption of any other religion 
would lead to disqualification from the quota.71 
 
The third principle, the separation of state and religion, declares that there shall be no 
official state religion, no religious instruction in state schools, and no taxes to support 
any particular religion. But the state has been entangled in the affairs of religion in 
numerous ways and the degree and extent of entanglement has increased since 
independence. The wall of separation can hardly be applied to the present Indian 
situation. This is precisely one of the reasons why Indian secularism is interpreted 
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differently from Western secularism. The cultural and historical realities of the Indian 
situation call for a different relationship between state and civil society than what is 
regarded as normative in Western political discourse, at least in the matter of religion. In 
India the state should favour all religions equally which would be a required extension 
to the principle of equality.72   
 
THE CONTEST OF SECULARISM 
Nationalism 
 
Ethnicity and nation are multivocal words: their meanings depend upon who uses the 
word and in which context. Ethnicity and ethnic group are sometimes defined as a 
common identity based on characteristics acquired either at birth (colour for example) 
or through cultural experience (language, religion, caste, sense of regional identity 
etc.).73 The primordialist approach to the study of nationalism, which I discuss later in 
this chapter, bases its image of identity on ethnicity, whereas Max Weber has noted that 
nation has notions with the sentiment of solidarity of ethnic communities, but the 
sentiment of ethnic solidarity does not by itself make a nation.74 In the past years many 
scholars have argued that aspects of modernisation in fact shape and intensify feelings 
based on religion, language, caste or similar characteristics and make such identities 
more ‘salient’ for politics than before.75  
 
The Latin origin word ‘natio’ originally means birth, but also tribe, race, nation and 
species. From the late thirteenth century on, it started to mean a group of people who are 
related to each other through common blood. In the 15th century, it already meant the 
people living in the same area.76 It is hard to find a comprehensive definition for the 
concept of nation. Even though nation means collective identity it should not be mixed 
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with other concepts that describe the same, like class, region, gender, race and religious 
community. 77 
 
The consensus among those disciplines78 that study nationalism is that the term nation is 
tantalisingly ambiguous. All, though, agree that a nation is not a race nor is it a state. 
They see language, religion, and territory as important factors in a nation, but none of 
them is the exclusive determinant of nation. However, their approach to the meaning of 
the word nation is always determined by the demands of their own discipline. Historians 
generally see a nation as the population of a sovereign state or as a population 
struggling for its own state, living within a definite territory, and possessing a common 
stock of thoughts and feelings that are transmitted during the course of a common 
history by a common will. They believe that the meaning of the nation is itself subject 
to historical change.79 A nation is also seen as a new entity, a socio-political community 
in modernity. It is not a mere by-product or an afterthought of nationalism either as an 
ideology or a movement. It is a new kind of collectivity in which some deep, permanent 
and profound changes have taken place in which society is organised. Nation here 
precedes nationalism, at least logically if not also historically.80 A crucial aspect in the 
articulation of any nationalist ideology is the intellectual construction of a nation as a 
continuity from a hoary past. The construction of histories and the invention of 
traditions in a nationalist context are intellectual activities of myth-making in modern 
times, whose political import far exceeds their factual content.81  
 
Ambiguity is even doubled with the use of the term nation-state. The nation-state is a 
modern phenomenon, characterised by the formation of a kind of state which has a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory, and which seeks 
to unite people by means of homogenisation and creating a common culture with shared 
symbols and values, as well as by reviving traditions and myths of origin, and 
sometimes inventing them. The main difference between a nation and a nation-state, 
when the nation and the state do not coincide, is that the members of a nation are 
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conscious of forming a community, whereas the nation-state seeks to create a nation and 
develop a sense of community stemming from it.82 A state, then, according to Max 
Weber, is a human community that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory.83 
 
Nationalism is as difficult to define as nation and nation-state are. Most commonly 
nationalism is considered the condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of 
people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, 
possessing a literature in which the aspiration of the nation has been expressed, and in 
some cases, having a common religion. Nationalism can also mean the actual historical 
process of establishing nationalities as political units, of building out of tribes and 
empires the modern institution of the national state.84 Nationalism has also been linked 
to the formation of states striving to produce cultural homogenisation, authorised 
histories, unified languages, and shared symbols of authority. States attempted to 
represent the nation as an all-encompassing principle of order and governance, and 
strove systematically to produce “the people” as a homogeneous entity. A very 
important aspect in the study of nationalism is the concept of “Other”: nation-states tend 
to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics but by a series of 
exclusions of the “Others”.85  
 
Power and culture are two crucial terms in the study of nationalism. The modern 
consciousness of the imperative for a fusion between culture and power, and the 
attempts to bring this about, form nationalism both as an ideology and a movement. 
This has two reference points, one external and the other internal. The external 
reference is to other cultures, nations and nation-states, which are perceived as obstacles 
in the way of one’s own nationalism. Under this aspect, nationalism seeks to liberate 
one’s own culture from the determinative influences and interference of other cultures. 
This came to be established as the right of nations for self-determination within the 
community of nation-states in the modern times. The internal dimension of the culture-
power fusion is what constitutes the specifically modern element in the notion of nation. 
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Here the reference is to the culture’s own past as the Other. Nationalism seeks to move 
away from the notion of the past, or the pre-modern form of the culture-power fusion, 
usually unequal and hierarchical, and construct an equal and formally homogeneous 
one. Here the demand is for the equal spread of power over culture as the transition to 
nation. In modernity he nationalist process of politicisation takes hold of culture in its 
totality, empowering all its members with equal rights and responsibilities, and sets 
them apart from cultures and individuals outside. The mobilisation of the nation’s 
masses in nationalism takes place not merely on the basis of commonality of political 
purpose and destiny as the emergence of a socio-political community. The masses who 
hitherto were excluded from the arena of public power through hierarchical structures of 
privileges/liabilities in society and dynastic rule in polity, now emerge politically in 
nationalism to constitute the new politico-civil society of equal rights and liabilities. 
Such is the specific form of congruence between culture and power in modern 
nationalism.86  
Approaches to Nationalism 
 
The study of nationalism can be divided into three streamlines: Primordialism, 
instrumentalism and constructivism. The division between the veins is not black and 
white but different kinds of interpretations can appear simultaneously.  
 
Primordialists claim that communities are natural and given. Every person who belongs 
to a community carries through life attachments derived from place of birth, kinship 
relations, religion, language and social practices. These attachments are natural and 
provide a basis for an easy affinity with other peoples from same background.87 
Primordialists pay attention to the character of modern nationalism and to the pre-
modern nation-state. This character is revealed through the beliefs in the historical 
origin and cultural heritage of the nation, and through the importance of social relations 
like the family and kinship.88 A German philosopher, J. G. Herder, considers each 
nationality a manifestation of the divine and therefore something sacred which should 
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be cultivated, not destroyed. He writes: “a nation is as natural as a plant, as a family, 
only with more branches”.89 The socio-biological version of this argument asserts that 
ethnicity, with all the primordial ties, is an extension of kinship and that kinship is the 
normal way to pursue collective goals in the struggle for survival.90 
 
Anthony D. Smith tries to solve the problem of choosing between a natural and a 
modern theory of the origin of nations by suggesting that nationalist movements could 
be motivated by historically constructed ethnicity.91 According to Smith the 
nationalisms that occur in different parts of  the world can be defined by what he calls 
the nationalist doctrine. According to the doctrine, humanity has been divided naturally 
into nations and all these nations have their own character. A nation is the source of all 
political power, and to gain freedom and self-understanding people need to identify 
themselves with the nation. This is why nations can only be fulfilled in their own states. 
Loyalty to the nation-state supersedes other loyalties and the first condition of global 
freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state.92 
 
Instrumentalist researchers consider that elites and political systems have created 
communities and the national feeling so that they could use these sentiments for 
promoting their own interests. Instrumentalists see nationalism and the nation-state as a 
typical phenomenon for the modern era which has evolved through the development of 
political institutions, like elections, political parties and administrative bureaucracies. 
According to them, nationalism is attached to the birth of the urban, industrialised 
community, and to that of nationality and national sovereignty.93 
 
Smith seems to represent both primordialism and instrumentalism by writing that the 
modern state has a central role in advancing nationalism, but he also thinks that the 
problem of legitimacy is more far-reaching. Nationalism rises from a widely spread 
moral crisis, in which the secular state challenges the divine authority. The attempts to 
solve this crisis have lead to different forms of nationalism. The two most common 
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bases for a state are a political community (a territorial state) and a community of 
culture. In territorial nationalism the leaders of the political community or the new state 
try to create a culturally homogeneous population, which would have a feeling of 
special ethnic bounds. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, seeks safety from a 
community that is culturally identifiable. In both of the cases the nationalists believe 
that their cultural communities either are or will be nations. 94 
 
An instrumentalist approach can be clearly seen in Ernest Gellner’s book Nations and 
Nationalism. Gellner also defines nationalism firstly as a political principle, where the 
political and the  national parts should be compatible. According to this principle, 
nationalism can be described best as a sentiment or as a movement. Nationalist 
sentiment arises from anger, when this principle has been violated, or the other way 
around, when the feeling of satisfaction or fulfilment has been achieved. From this kind 
of a feeling arises the nationalist movement. Nationalism is the theory of political 
legitimacy, when the ethnic and the political boarders should be congruent.95 Gellner 
continues: “But nationalism is not awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though 
that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of 
social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, 
each protected by its own state. It uses some of the pre-existent cultures, generally 
transforming them in the process, but it cannot possibly use them all. […] Nations as 
natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political 
destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns 
them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: 
that is a reality”.96 
 
Gellner writes that nationalism sees itself as the universal and natural order of the 
humanity’s political life. It cannot be noticed until it demands its own state. Nationalism 
is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do 
not yet exist. Nationalism cannot exist in stateless societies. If a state does not exist no 
one can ask where its borders are convergent with the borders of the nation. According 
to instrumentalist interpretation, the human element has great significance in the birth of 
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nations. This human element includes inventions and social engineering97. The idea of 
nations as natural, as God’s way of classifying people, as inherited political destinies is 
a myth; in reality, nationalism sometimes changes the already existing cultures to 
nations and sometimes invents them and quite often demolishes the earlier cultures. 
Therefore, analytically, nationalism comes before nation.98  
 
A more recent approach in the research on nationalism and ethnicity is constructivism. 
This new approach leans on rhetoric of post-modernity and aims at changing the logic 
of instrumentalism and primordialism, because, according to constructivism, 
instrumentalists are considered too concentrated on interests and primordialists too 
concentrated on values. The constructivist approach sees ethnicity as something that 
people have produced themselves. Ethnicity is something like a creative social activity, 
through which a common identity can be formed and political organisations become 
woven into a consciousness of shared identity. Certain common characteristics are 
required so that the common identity can form itself. These characteristics are the rules 
on how to speak and what to say, cultural habits and practices and political organisation, 
which all form a common identity. This identity becomes conscious through time.99 The 
difference from instrumentalism is that, according to constructivism, identity has not 
been build for any other purposes than for itself. According to constructivists, a 
common national identity is composed by itself or consciously build, but then this 
happens only for the sake of the community. National identity is based neither on rights 
nor attachments gained by birth, like the primordialists claim. 
 
Leroy Vail has well summarised the meaning of the approach.100 According to him, 
ethnic identity has taken its form through different phases and it has been influenced by 
subordinators and subordinates. Normally, in the first phase of forming the ethnic 
identity, there are a group of intellectuals that have a tremendous impact on the identity. 
In the second phase, the identity starts to be influenced by the people working in the 
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administration who subordinate the people through indirect administration. This 
influences the nature and limits of the ideology. Third, normal people have a real need 
for so-called traditional values, especially under times of rapid social change, which 
opens ways for the acceptance of new ideologies. Therefore, ethnicity is manufactured 
rather than given, and innovative rather than atavistic 101.   
 
Benedict Anderson has given an interesting definition to a nation by describing it in his 
book Imagined Communities as an imagined political community. This means that a 
nation has been imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined 
because even the members of the smallest nation will never know all the people living 
in that nation and still they have a feeling of togetherness and they have a common 
picture of their community.102 Gellner makes a comparable point when he rules that 
“Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
where they do not exist.”103 The difference,  though, is that Gellner assimilates 
invention to fabrication and falsity rather than to imagining and creation. This shows 
clearly that Gellner is an instrumentalist while as Anderson is a contructivist.  
 
A nation has been imagined as limited because even the largest of them has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself 
coterminous with mankind. A nation is imagined as sovereign because the concept was 
born during a time when the Enlightenment and the Revolution were destroying the idea 
of a divine dispensation and hierarchical dynastic realm. Nations started to dream of 
freedom. The gage and emblem of this freedom was the sovereign state. Finally, a 
nation is imagined as a community because regardless of the inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail in it, a nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship. 
This fraternity has made it possible that, during the last couple of hundred years, 
millions of people have been ready to die for these limited imaginings. 104  
  
According to Anderson, nationalism is a cultural artefact that in a way came to replace 
religion after it had faded during the Enlightenment. An important change that benefited 
the most the rise of nationalism was the expansion of written vernacular languages. It 
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first happened in Europe, when Latin was replaced as the most important language, and 
later in the colonial world. In the colonies vernacular languages were promoted through 
education and a local elite was created to help in administration. Through the promotion 
of vernacular languages, the means of communication also increased and the amount of 
people reached by these languages grew because people outside the intelligentsia were 
able to understand vernacular languages. Anderson uses as an example the print-
capitalism which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about 
themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways. This made the 
new kind of imagined community possible, which set the stage for the modern state. 
The potential stretch of these communities was inherently limited, and, at the same 
time, bore none but the most fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries. 
Through print-capitalism these nations got their national print-languages.105  
 
To sum up, the main aspect of nationalism is that a group of people, defined by 
common religion, language, decent and history that forms a nation, aims at achieving its 
own state.  
Communalism 
 
”To awaken to history was to cease to live instinctively. It was to begin to 
see oneself and one’s group the way the outside world saw one; and it was 
to know a kind of rage. India was now full of this rage. There had been a 
general awakening. But everybody awakened first to his own group or 
community; every group thought itself unique in its awakening; and every 
group sought to separate its rage from the rage of other groups.” 106  
 
The Encyclopaedia of Nationalism defines communalism as “a sense of community 
among ethnic or linguistic groups. The word is often used as a synonym for tribalism. It 
may also denote a system of government in which communes or local communities 
possess a certain amount of autonomy inside a federal state.”107 This definition is quite 
exhaustive and is only partly applicable to India. Communalism in India definitely bases 
on a community feeling along both ethnic and linguistic lines but in Indian communities 
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the tendency was towards centralisation of power until the 1990s, but after this, village 
councils have been widely promoted.108 The feeling of togetherness in communities 
grew but it did not affect so much the rise of communalism. Communalism in India is 
rather a sense of community among ethnic and linguistic groups in which each 
individual of the community shares a perception of the distinctiveness of his ethnic 
group from the other groups surrounding, and a sense of common historical experience. 
To this sentiment is normally added continuity through biological descent, and the 
sharing of common social and cultural conditions. At the heart of ethnicity is the feeling 
of being special.109 Communalism is not just a unique Indian phenomenon. Richard G. 
Fox has compared Sikh communalism with Welsh nationalism and concludes that in 
both nationalisms derive from modernity and the incompetence of a bureaucratic 
state.110  
 
K. N. Panikkar adds a new factor to the definition of communalism, namely religion. He 
separates communitarian and communal identities from each other. Panikkar explains 
what he means by communal identity but the definition of communitarian identity 
remains unclear. A communal identity is firstly an identity of belonging to a 
community. Secondly, it can include a feeling of belonging to a religion. 
Communitarian identity, according to him, is religious. A communal identity does not 
necessarily need to be against another religion or community. Panikkar continues that 
these religious or communitarian identities need not necessarily be communal. Yet it is 
important to recognise that such an identity could be transformed into a communal one 
by posing an antagonistic relationship. Therefore, religious and communitarian 
identities form necessary pre-requisites for communalism. Without these pre-requisites, 
the type of communalism existing in India today cannot take place at all. Communalism 
usually assumes that there is a dormant communitarian feeling which can be activated. 
Communal forces are today engaged in reinforcing and activating religious 
communitarian identities.111  
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Surajan Das adds an important view to Panikkar’s definition. A communal identity, 
when regarded as religious, concerns personal allegiance to a set of practices and 
dogmas, which are often part of a search for a reward from the transcendental reality. 
Communitarian identity, on the other hand, entails individual commitment to special 
interests of a religious community for gaining worldly advantages at the expense of 
other communities. Religious violence is provoked by sectarian and doctrinaire 
differences; communal animosities are primarily motivated by conflicts over political 
power and economic resources.112 When communalists strive for political power and 
autonomy, or independence for the territory one can speak of religious nationalism. 
Different from Panikkar and Das, I use the word ‘communalist’ to refer to 
communalism as ideology and movement and word ‘communal’ to refer to a feeling 
based on the togetherness of a community, which may or may not be related to 
communalism.    
 
When communalism has a political or an economic aspiration we can start speaking of 
ideology. T. N. madan has defined three principals for ideology which are also 
applicable to communalism. First, every ideology is rooted  in historical experience, but 
it is futuristic even when it calls for a return to historical fundamentals. It is, then, a link 
between identity and aspiration. The roots of communalism are in the ethnic identity 
and traditions of a person, which are then promoted to highlight the difference to other 
identities. Secondly, an ideology is a comprehensive, even totalising, blueprint for 
living and for action, which defines whether to preserve elements of the status quo, or to 
revive elements of a past that are considered weakened or lost, or to proceed towards a 
newly visualised future. Communalism is a way of life for the supporters of its ideas. 
Sikh communalists, for example, retreated to their sanctuary, the Golden Temple of 
Amritsar, to be able to practise their religion and plan their political activity. Thirdly, 
ideology is rhetorical in form: it seeks to convince and persuade people of the 
desirability of a particular world image, and mobilise them for action to achieve the 
stated objective. Hindu communalists seek to revive the historical Golden Age to 
promote their idea of a Hindu state and to gain more support for this.113   
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To sum up, communalism aims to improve the social, economic or political position of 
a community based on religion, language or common descent/ethnicity within a state. 
Communalisation takes place when some issue is being used to promote the social, 
economic and political position of the community. An important aspect of 
communalism is collective antagonism. As we see, nationalism and communalism are 
both based on a group of people connected by these common features. However, 
whereas communalism aims at political power and social and economic benefits, 
nationalism aims at creating a state for a nation. Communalism can change into 
nationalism, and in general the line between communalism and nationalism is hard to 
draw. In India, communalism supposes that Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims form separate 
communities that oppose each other. These communities can then imagine themselves 
as nations through their communal feeling, which is created, for example, by 
emphasising the periods of history when the community was the one that ruled in India. 
The Evolvement of Communal Identities 
It is often asserted that communalism is a modern phenomenon, suggesting thereby that 
communal tensions, riots and politics became a major factor in the Indian society only 
during the colonial rule. The pre-colonial society was not devoid of tensions and 
conflict, but one cannot make the conclusion that communalism was created by 
colonialism. However, the colonial period witnessed the recurrence of communalist 
riots from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the days of the partition 1947, and 
since then they have been an integral part of Indian politics.114  
 
The political life in pre-colonial Indian society was structured around a peculiar 
organisation of hierarchically distributed power. The connection between people and the 
state was tenuous, and identity itself also meant a somewhat different kind of social 
adhesion. The logic of traditional identity appears to have been different from its 
modern counterpart in several respects. Politically, premodern identities tended to be 
fuzzy. The identity of an individual was distributed through several different social 
practices. The person could belong to his village, local community, caste group, 
religious sect, language or kinship complexes. It was not only the individual identity 
that was plural and flexible; the structure of identities itself was fuzzy in a related 
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sense.115 Traditional societies are a world of transitions rather than of boundaries. 
Traditionally, individuals were equipped with a fairly detailed and sometimes 
astonishingly complicated system of classificatory categories by which to distinguish 
the relevantly similar from the different, us from them116. Still, they simply lacked the 
cognitive means to generate a global picture of the spaces in which social groups lived. 
Conflicts were not rare among religious sects, castes, or other social groups; but in the 
absence of the knowledge of maps and numbers, they were primarily wars of position in 
the terrain of everyday life rather than wars of manoeuvre in the political arena.117 
 
The British colonial power put an end to this by bringing an entire cognitive apparatus 
from modern Europe, especially mapping and counting for their administrative 
purposes. The colonial power produced an image of India as a geographic and 
demographic entity. The fundamental transformation involved a picture of the social 
world in which the organisation and perception of social difference was altered: it 
changed people’s images of their collective selves and their occupancy of the social 
world. People realised what it meant to be a member of a majority or a minority 
community, and how to act appropriately in these social roles. The political 
consequence of this was decisive: it made possible a membership of individuals in 
abstract religious identities like Hindus and Muslims, and a new kind of impersonal and 
abstract violence, as people began to ascribe to them non-traditional capacity to have 
intentions and undertake actions.118 
 
Enumeration processes began in the early nineteenth century, as did the establishment 
of western-style education for producing a new, collaborating middle class. The British 
intended to create a class which could become the interpreter between the British and 
the people, but English education spread unevenly, as it concentrated mainly in the 
metropolitan cities of the coastal presidencies and created an elite that was able to come 
to power.119 By the middle of the century, the first unintended consequences of these 
processes had become apparent. Sections of the new intelligentsia grasped the sources 
of power this space provided. However, the earliest anti-colonial writers had only 
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resolved to defy colonial power, but had not yet been able to specify their nation. The 
first Bengali ‘nationalist’ writers120 asked themselves whether the nation they belonged 
to was a nation of Bengalis, Hindus or of Indians.121   
 
The British also ‘created’ the Indian peasantry by forming a new type of property right 
on land by welding together existing forms of proprietary domination with the 
obligation to pay the land revenue. They speeded and generalised changes which had 
gathered pace over the centuries. Demand in foreign markets for Indian agricultural 
produce was an important stimulus to peasant commodity production and settled 
agriculture. The British also transformed the rural elites into landlords and merchants, 
which then led to the loss of status and political rights of the ordinary peasants of the 
village.122 These peasant were later a good ground for mobilisation to communalist 
organisations in the twentieth century, as their identity still remained traditional and 
religious and because they were to a large extent exploited by the new secularised 
middle class.123 There were different personal laws for the advocates of different 
religions. This, then, legally authorised a certain interpretation of Indian society as 
being made up of discrete and legally incompatible communities and caste groups that 
were governable only through encapsulation and control of their irrational religious 
passion.124 The colonial state in India was, however, never bifurcated, as was the case in 
parts of Africa. The bifurcation of the colonial state in Africa was expressed in a spatial 
separation between direct rule under colonial law in the urban areas and the indirect rule 
through native authorities and customary law in the rural areas.125  
 
For census purposes the British colonial power tabulated and identified all Indians by 
both religion and caste or so-called tribal community, as well as by occupation, age and 
sex.126 By the end of the nineteenth century, a growing array of official materials 
including military recruitment manuals, gazetteers and census reports featured listings 
assigning people of particular title and background to a certain order or status with 
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either honourable or humiliating qualities being possessed by each group.127 The census 
system and the colonial governability provided a new matrix of intelligibility through 
which native subjects could come to know themselves as communities. This new matrix 
also displaced older hierarchies and produced a social imaginary structured by 
consolidated communities in competition. North India had for centuries been marked by 
rather clear political and military hierarchies governed by a mainly Muslim elite. 
Religious identities were both visible and subject to political regulation, but were not 
necessarily important in relation to the distribution and exercise of power, as long social 
hierarchies and political loyalties remained intact and nonnegotiable. With the intrusion 
of British colonialism, these political hierarchies were subverted and rendered fluid and 
negotiable, especially after rebellion of 1857128 and the subsequent curbing of the 
political power of Muslim rulers all over the subcontinent. The higher-caste Hindu 
communities that had most effectively utilised the new educational and commercial 
opportunities gained new power and public visibility as representatives and “natural 
leaders” of the Hindu community. Conversely, the Muslim elite lost both their former 
aura and their “mandate to rule” and patronage power, and were now forced to represent 
themselves as leaders of the Muslim community as such. The enumeration was also 
central to the mechanisms through which natives were to be represented in accordance 
with their numerical weight. From 1880s on, the local municipal administration 
emerged, but the criteria of eligibility was (as in Britain itself) determined by income 
levels and property, which generally disadvantaged Muslims and the lower class.129 
 
The enumeration was not an easy task for the British because of the fuzzy identities of 
the Indians. In the first Census of Punjab in 1855, Hindus and Sikhs were enumerated 
together, as Sikhism was considered being only a branch of Hinduism. In the 1881 
census, Sikhs were enumerated separately from Hindus but still the application of the 
term Sikh was not defined. Some of those persons that could have considered 
themselves Sikhs today might have been enumerated as Hindus in 1881, because of the 
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division in the Sikh religion and its origins in Hinduism.130 In 1922 the term ‘Sikh’ was 
defined to mean a person who professes the Sikh faith. The decision excluded the 
Sahajdhari Sikhs from the Sikh definition, because they saw themselves as part of the 
larger Hindu religious community.131 By the end of the nineteenth century, the colonial 
authorities were in a very different position from those of their predecessors, who had 
been involved in the collection of social and statistical data. From mid-century onwards, 
the wider intellectual climate affecting the colonial data-collectors underwent important 
changes, most notably through the world-wide elevation of ethnology to the status of an 
authoritative discipline attracting both Western and Asian scientists. Within India, the 
Mutiny-Rebellion of 1857 drove both military and civil officials to expand and 
formalise their networks of control and surveillance, and to pursue the search for social 
knowledge.132  
 
The Government Act of India of 1935 introduced the principle of communal 
representation throughout the political system, elevating religious identity above all else 
and providing separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims. Political coalitions began to 
be built along communal lines; religious leaders acquired vested interests in 
demonstrating numerically large followings as the surest path to political power. 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, ‘the father of Pakistan’, claimed and was conceded political 
importance up to 1947, not as the leader of a major political party but as the leader of 
the Muslims living in the Hindu majority area of the subcontinent. The problem of 
religious minorities was not solved by partition, a policy of divide and leave.133 
 
The British colonial rule definitely had a role in shaping cultural-national identities and 
urging communalism forward. The question that remains is whether they did that on 
purpose or by accident. Partha Chatterjee notes that the British advanced 
communalisation accidentally by complex arrangements of governance with the British 
provinces and the princely states. They recognised the complexities of Indian society 
and tried to follow a policy of non-interference in many areas of the social life of 
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Indians.134 C. P. Bhambhri, on the other hand, thinks that the British made the 
communalist divisions greater by making every effort to promote religious divisions and 
by following the strategies of preferential and discriminatory treatment of different 
religious communities. The consequence of this dual strategy of active encouragement 
and neglect was the reinforcement of religiosity and caste feeling among the Indians 
which the post-independence state of India has inherited. This legacy has often turned to 
religious conflicts.135 The British enumerated the people of the different tribes and 
peoples in India for their own administrative purposes, which then unfortunately broke 
the native culture and gave rise to the new types of identities and later served as a 
prerequisite for communalisation. It would be wrong to say that communalisation was 
the aim of the British. It was more an accident. 
 
Thomas Blom Hansen has his conception on how the communal identities were 
constructed. He sees communalism as being an irrational force of primitive and atavistic 
hatred, emanating from the “masses” steeped in tradition and superstition, who are an 
easy target for manipulators. According to him, a communal identity has not been build 
from the outside but has constructed itself. He presents three reasons for this. First, there 
are everyday practices of neighbourliness. This includes the relatively limited 
interaction across community boundaries that has historically been substantiated by 
patterns of settlement in separate parts of villages or urban neighbourhoods. Second, the 
narratives, rumours and sometimes experiences of riots establish the other community 
as the source of absolute evil and brutality. The third is the complex reproduction of 
communal violence: the formation, organisation, and dissemination of political 
identities around discourses on the other. One may distinguish between one form of 
identification of the self and the community that is derived primarily from experiences 
of riot situations, rumours, and daily practises, and the form of identification of the 
community and the nation that derives its principles of intelligibility from larger 
ideological constructions and political problematics. He thinks that the waves of rioting 
in the 1990s were in most parts of India rarely triggered by local circumstances, but 
rather by the ideological fantasies and Hindu communalist discourse systematically 
circulated and organised in the public in the preceding years.136  
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Economic Reasons 
The economic policies which the government has undertaken since independence have 
hastened the process of communalisation. Immediately following independence, the 
Congress Party, in order to gain support from a broad range of Indian citizens, 
especially the huge numbers of the poor, instituted policies which stunted economic 
growth. This was done by promoting economic self-reliance, protecting Indian 
manufacturers from international competition, following an import-substitution 
industrial strategy, deterring the international investors with bureaucratic obstacles, and 
subsidising an inefficient public sector. Since the 1980s, the Indian government has 
began to liberalise the economy. Initiatives aimed at privatisation and increased global 
competitiveness threaten to remove job security from the middle and lower-middle 
classes. Commerce has replaced traditional bonds of exchange, and contracts have 
replaced custom.137 Citizens respond to this by turning to communalism and 
communalist parties, which they hope will solve their problems of material deprivation, 
psychological uncertainty and ideological anomie. Because of this, it was in the interest 
of political parties to appeal to common religious and ethnic sentiments. Competition 
for material goods and services further tends to encourage people to organise 
themselves along religious, caste, and ethnic lines.138   
 
Sukumar Muralidharan139 criticises that communalism has been excluded from the 
research on economy and left to the analytical domain of history, sociology or politics. 
Communalism is a change in the institutional factors which affect the whole society. 
Communalism is normally seen as an irrational, destructive force which obstructs and 
distorts the regular movement of development, but which could be dissolved or 
extinguished with the advance of science and education and with material progress. 
However, advances in science and technology have not necessarily dissolved the social 
divisions and discriminatory practices that are based on religion, community, language, 
caste and creed. In India in particular, neither education nor material progress has 
eliminated social discriminatory processes.140 It is the other way around; economic 
growth has been divided very unequally. This can be seen in the situation in Jammu and 
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Kashmir. Muslims have not been granted the higher and better paid administrative posts 
and Hindus have been preferred in employment141. According to Muralidharan, one of 
the justifications of a nation-state is the continuing growth of the national income, from 
which different sections are entitled to their respective shares. However, when the 
justification of the nation-state fails in periods of economic stagnation, disputes over 
material entitlements become endemic. Differences of class and status, submerged in 
the task of national development, come to the surface. Incapable of sustaining the 
politics of consensus, the nation-state increasingly has recource to the politics of 
coercion.142 The Indian nation found itself in such a conjuncture during the Indira 
Gandhi era, and to some extent during the years of Rajiv Gandhi. 
 
Zoya Hasan presents an interesting explanation for the strengthening of the communal 
identity. According to her, the new generations of mobile middle castes and classes, 
born after independence in the countryside and in the city, were attracted to communal 
revitalisation movements. There is a tendency on the part of many of the beneficiaries 
of the green revolution, and professionals and entrepreneurs, to channel their newly 
acquired wealth into temples and other religious causes. For the new groups, patronising 
ritual practices not only earned them respect, but also provided a familiar and satisfying 
world view and social identity. The concern for identity is particularly important for the 
Indian middle class eager to find its social moorings in a rapidly changing society. This 
might be one of the principal reasons why community identities and community based 
politics have been revived and intensified. They have gained greater legitimacy in the 
context of growing competition, which has upset the existing status and power 
hierarchies that lead to resentment and envy. In Northern India, Maharashtra and 
Gujarat, where there are large concentrations of Muslims, communalist violence became 
endemic as a result of struggles between Hindus and Muslims over land, property and 
business opportunities. What Hasan saw happening in the beginning of the 1990s was 
that in these areas a particular dominant group or caste, faced with a challenge from 
rival groups or lower classes, gave a communalist character to such conflicts.143       
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Politicisation  
Democratic participation is both an opportunity for the secularists to contain 
communalism by using state power, and an area of dispute among the contending 
ideologies. The representational state in India is subject to multiple pressures from 
classes, castes and communities, and their ideological worlds.144 Religious identities 
have had a powerful influence on social consciousness, which then has given rise to 
communal feeling and solidarity. Middle-class politics have increasingly resorted to 
communalism as a possible source of either maintaining or achieving political power. In 
this process the relationship between politics and communalism has become 
complementary, one reinforcing the other.145 
 
In the nineteenth century, communalism was an expression which was deeply rooted in 
the interests, outlook and point of view of the middle classes. They were  in a social 
situation characterised by economic stagnation and the absence of a vigorous struggle to 
transform society – the communal question could then be described as a petty bourgeois 
question par excellence.146 Later, merchants, traders, feudal classes and even sections of 
the peasantry have been drawn into it. The resurgence of communalism in recent years 
stems from the broadening of its social base.147 Communalists understood that by 
politicising the issues of which they were concerned they could attract masses and gain 
more power for their demands. This seems to have worked out in India. The advocates 
of Sikh nationalism are mostly young, unemployed men. Hindu nationalist appeals were 
until the beginning of the twenty-first century heavily supported among the rising, 
selectively modernised middle class, who are conservative and pious in their 
sentiments.148 But with varying levels of intensity, Hindu nationalism appeals nowadays 
also to young, lower-caste males, who are anti-Muslim in their rhetoric.149 
 
The political parties of pre- and post-independent India fall into two categories. First, 
there are parties organised around communalist ideologies, like Hindu Maha Sabha and 
the Muslim League during the pre-independence period, and the BJP, the Akali Dal and 
the Muslim League in contemporary India. The parties in the second category are those 
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which use communalism for political support and mobilisation without necessarily 
adopting communalism as their political ideology. K. N. Panikkar claims that the Indian 
National Congress under the lead of Indira Gandhi falls into this category. Indira 
Gandhi tried to identify herself with Hinduism even though she represented a secular 
party. Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir are explicit instances of communalist politics to 
which the Congress party  had succumbed.150  
  
Bipan Chandra brings a new aspect to Panikkar’s definition. He has come to the 
conclusion that it would be wrong to brand the Congress Party as a communalist party, 
earlier or now. According to Chandra, communalist parties and groups are those which 
are structured around the communalist ideology. If you take away communalist 
ideology or make the parties abandon communalist ideology, nothing is left of them. In 
other words, the communalist party only exists because of communalism.151 Chandra 
distinguishes communalism and opportunism and classifies the Congress party rather as 
an opportunistic party. He asserts that there is a difference between communalist parties 
which are structured along communalist ideologies, and secular, even weakly secular, 
parties taking an opportunistic stand towards communalism. As an example of the 
opportunistic politics of the Congress Party Chandra explains how the Congress party 
used to put up Muslim candidates in Muslim areas and Brahmins in Brahmin areas for 
gaining the votes of those areas. They would never have put up a Muslim candidate in 
an area where there are only three to four per cent Muslims. Opportunism is partially a 
response to the communalisation of society.152  
 
For the state, secularism has become to mean attempts at keeping violent conflicts 
between groups and bestowing equal privileges on each community. Again, this equal 
treatment has to be made compatible with the notion of equity, where the less privileged 
groups need to be favoured. Such an attempt has become even more difficult because 
the different communities feel that it is precisely by seizing political power that they 
would turn the distribution of the scarce resources in their favour. It is in this sense that 
the aggressive pursuit of self-interest of the individual on the one hand, and the strategic 
factors of political pressure groups on the other, have entered the political field in India. 
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While the basic ethical principles of religion that sought to provide harmony and 
security for the community are gradually disappearing, communalist forces are 
becoming as powerful or more powerful than the class forces in the shaping of 
development.153 
 
Thomas Blom Hansen concludes that Indian society is probably one of the most 
politicised societies in the world. It happened because the democratic order that the 
leaders of India fought for released new, assertive and uncontrollable social identities 
that over time produced a form of modernity –pluralist, creative, chaotic and brutal at 
the same time.154  
Hindu Nationalism 
 
The Hindu nationalist movement, led by the political Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 
the militant organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has grown into the most 
powerful cluster of political and cultural movements in India. Hindu nationalism 
evolved to the ruling ideology of contemporary India in the 1990s when the BJP 
emerged as a powerful party in Indian politics. Hindu nationalism has evolved from a 
cultural organisation into a mass political party, not only in the political life but also in 
the everyday life of the people. It is contesting Indian secularism because it seeks for a 
Hindu nation, which can only be created when the Hindu majority adapts the Hindutva 
ideology. This majoritarianism combines well-established paternalist and xenophobic 
discourses with democratic and universalist discourses on rights and entitlements, and 
has successfully articulated desires and anxieties in both urban and rural India.155 This 
was highlighted in the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, when the 
Hindu nationalists pulled down a mosque after a populist campaign because it was 
assumedly on the same spot as a former temple of a Hindu god. 
 
Hindu nationalism has been explained as cultural and historical nationalism. In Partha 
Chatterjee’s view it is an entirely modern, rational and historicist idea. As many other 
modern ideologies, it allows for a central role of the state in the modernisation of 
society and strongly defends the state’s unity and sovereignty. Its appeal is not religious 
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but political.156 Even though Hindu nationalist leaders might appropriate religious 
symbols and rituals, the Hindu nationalist movement can hardly be considered a 
‘religious’ campaign akin to the Islamist movement in the Middle East or the Protestant 
revival in the United States and Latin America. Instead it is like any other communalist 
movement, a diverse and disparate response to social, economic, and political 
dislocation in India.157  
 
Thomas Blom Hansen widens the definition made by Chatterjee by approaching Hindu 
nationalism from a constructivist perspective. In cultural nationalism the central idea is 
the belief that a community consists of one common culture. Cultural nationalism also 
emphasises constant strengthening of the community to prevent it from falling into 
pieces. It tries to create some sense to the world by building one, homogenous culture 
and recognising one nation as the nuclear of the nation.158 According to Blom Hansen, 
Hindu nationalism has constructed itself inconsistently with the modern. Hansen argues 
that Hindu nationalism is above all an attempt to deal with the modern and to control it. 
Democracy also gives rise to a new imagination of society that makes new identities 
and demands possible, but also makes possible new forms of violent conflict and 
fantasies of power and xenophobias. He sees Hindu nationalism both as an expression 
of the politicisation of  Indian public culture, and a reaction against it.159  
 
The term ‘Hindu’ was coined over two thousand years ago to categorise a people living 
within the Indus valley, and was unrelated to religious belief or practice.160 The word is 
Arabic-Persian in origin and it has etymologically the same meaning as the word India, 
which is Greek-Roman in origin.161 Notions of Hinduism as a unified religion, Hindu 
culture as a distinct culture, and Hindu as an adherent of Hinduism, are the products of 
orientalist scholars, missionaries and colonial administrations in the Indian subcontinent 
since the seventeenth century.162 The term was also changed to mean a religious 
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category and extended to include all those who were not either Muslims or 
Christians.163 Hindu nationalists use this categorisation in their definition of Hindus as 
well.  
From a Cultural Organisation to a Mass Political Party 
While Indian religious groups have been involved in the politics as far back as the 17th 
or 18th centuries, there was no attempt to conduct a unified Hindu movement until the 
late 19th century.164 The rise of Hindu nationalism has its roots firstly in the 
development of the Muslim identity and Muslim movement in the 19th century, and 
secondly in the struggle against the colonial power. In Northern India the strengthening 
of Hindu identity began in the cow protection movement, which demanded that the 
possession of the holy cows should be given to Hindus, because Muslims only killed 
them for the meat. For Hindus cows symbolise mothers, and therefore it is strongly 
forbidden to eat beef. The encounters turned into violence and the movements 
succeeded to mobilise a great number of Hindus. The significance of the movement for 
Hindu nationalists was that through it people either adapted a Hindu or a Muslim 
identity. From another perspective, the movements caused a division between Hindus 
and Muslims of Northern India.165 
 
The first Hindu nationalist movements were socio-religious, such as Brahmo Samaj and 
Arya Samaj, which were both founded by high caste religious Hindus in the 1870s. 
These organisations were to a large extent set up against the British colonial state and 
Christian missions. Their primary concern was to maintain the basic elements of the 
traditional social order and culture of Hindus.166 The organisations also advocated 
certain aspects of Western society, like public education, improvements in living 
conditions for ‘untouchables’ and the rights of women.167 Arya Samaj had also included 
an anti-Muslim component.168 At the same time, the tension between cultural 
preservation and modernisation was solved through the invention of a distant Golden 
Age and the reinterpretation of this ancient time in Indian history when the Aryans ruled 
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India. The Vedic tradition that derives from that era was revitalised to meet the 
challenge of the West.169 Consequently, the medieval age, when the Mughals were the 
rulers of India, is described as the age of decadence and the modern period as the age of 
revival. This Hindu-centred view is being extended to almost all aspects of Indian 
history.170  
 
Soon after the establishment of these socio-religious Hindu organisations, politics began 
to merge into Hindu nationalism. Hindu politicians employed Hindu rhetoric to 
champion the nationalist cause of independence from the British. As the movement for 
independence grew stronger, and as Hindu nationalists began to realise the political 
benefits of employing religious symbols and ideology, they established various Hindu 
organisations. All-India Hindu Mahasabha,171 founded in 1920s, was the first 
politically-oriented Hindu communalist organisation.172 Nowadays one of the largest 
Hindu nationalist organisations, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)173 was 
founded in 1925. The goal of the organisation was to train young men to resist the 
temptations of secular society. The RSS adapted some features of the Indian military 
communities, like military education and certain religiousness. Traditional physical 
practices have been part of khastriya’s174 lifestyle everywhere in India. Only through 
education could Indians get a national consciousness strong enough. The RSS stayed 
strictly as a cultural and educational organisation during its first two decades.175 Today 
the RSS is an umbrella organisation of 32 social, cultural  and political organisations. It 
has been labelled as a chauvinist organisation, and the radically changing roles of Indian 
women are a key issue for the Hindu extremists. They have also begun to infiltrate 
academic, cultural, and government institutions. Some Indian historians are afraid to 
publish historical researches against the interpretation of Hindu extremists after being 
threatened by RSS members.176 
 
The final push for the RSS was a book by the leader of the organisation, Vinayak 
Domodar Savarkar. In the book,  Savarkar coined the term ‘Hindutva’ which became to 
                                                          
169
 Jaffrelot 1996, 11-3. 
170
 Panikkar 1991, 3. 
171
 ’Great Hindu Council’. 
172
 Kolodner 1995, 235. 
173
 ’Association of National Volunteers’. 
174
 Kshatriya is the soldier caste.  
175
 Jaffrelot 1996, 33-41. 
 50
 
mean a political ideology. In addition to the religious side Hindutva also comprises 
cultural, linguistic, social and political aspects.177 Savarkar minimises the importance of 
religious criteria in the definition of a Hindu by claiming that Hinduism was only one of 
the attributes of ‘Hinduness’. Hindu, Hindustan and Hindutva mean the whole 
civilisation and history. Hindutva does not mean the term but the history.178  
 
“Hindutva is not a word but a history. Not only the spiritual or religious 
history of our people as at times it is mistaken to be by being confounded 
with the other cognate term, Hinduism. Hinduism is only a derivative, a 
fraction, a part of Hindutva….Hindutva embraces all the departments of 
thought and activity of the whole being of our Hindu race”.179 
 
Savarkar’s argument is that the Aryans, who settled in India in the early periods of 
history, already formed a nation, which is now embodied in Hindus. Hindutva, 
according to him, rests on three pillars, which are geographical unity, racial features and 
a common culture. Savarkar minimises the religious criteria in the definition of a Hindu 
by claiming that Hinduism was only one of the attributes of Hinduness.180 Savarkar’s 
notion of Hinduism concentrates on cultural criteria rather than on racial theory. It is in 
harmony with the traditional Brahminical world view, but at the same time it represents 
ethnic nationalism, which has borrowed many features from Western theories.181 Hindu 
nationalism is a political project. The aim of Hindutva, political Hinduism, is to change 
the traditional religious identity to a modern political identity. In this sense Hindu 
nationalism is different from Sikh nationalism, for example, because as a nation-
building project it is non-religious.182 According to Savarkar it is necessary to create 
Hindu Rashtra, a state based on Hinduism. Its inhabitants are not expected to be Hindus 
in the first meaning of the word. The traditional Hindus are considered too feminine, 
irrational, pagans and anarchic, and that is why they are not able to run a state. The new 
Hindus are able do to this because they live in urban India and they understand the 
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Western civilisation and its values. The modern Hindus are able to adapt this 
information and re-interpret the Hindu tradition.183  
 
Mohandas ‘Mahatma’ Gandhi was assassinated on 31 January, 1948, by a radical Hindu 
nationalist and a member of the RSS. Gandhi became a victim of assassination because 
he had demanded that the Indian government pay compensation to Pakistan for its 
losses in the Partition and willing to settle the arguments with the Muslim leaders. In the 
months following Gandhi’s murder, Jawaharlal Nehru showed his determination to deal 
with Hindu nationalists and banned the RSS until the leaders of the organisation had 
written a constitution for the organisation on democratic terms. The RSS was disbanded 
in July 1949.184 This stemmed from Nehru’s conviction that Mahatma’s killing was only 
the first stage in a ‘fairly widespread conspiracy’185 to seize power, in which the prime 
mover was the RSS. In the 1950s the RSS began to strive actively to become a political 
organisation. The members of the RSS saw the Congress party as being too strongly 
based on Western ideas and concepts. They thought that the young state would need a 
new political party whose programme would build on a Hindu world view.186  
 
Since the independence in 1947, a number of other Hindu organisations have been 
established. Bharatiya Jana Sangh187 party was founded in 1951 as the nuclear of the 
political activity of Hindu nationalism. But in the 1950s it did not have resources to 
become a major part of Indian politics.188 Jana Sangh concentrated all its activity during 
the existence of the party to Northern India and strove to copy the election campaign of 
the Congress party. The problem with Jana Sangh’s strategy was that it concentrated too 
much on the Hindibelt of the Northern India, and on topics like the status of Hindi, the 
question of the Hindu refugees from Kashmir and objection to Pakistan.189 
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In 1964, the former leader of the RSS, Mahdav Sadashiv Golwalkar, established the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)190, an organisation dedicated to ensuring that Hindu 
values influenced the Indian polity. Its objectives were formulated in a pamphlet to 
consolidate “Hindu society,” to spread the Hindu values of life, to establish a network 
comprising all Hindus living outside India, and “to welcome back all who had gone out 
of the Hindu fold and to rehabilitate them as part and parcel of the Universal Hindu 
Society”.191 The integration of Hindu nationalists to the rest of society continued in the 
1970s. In 1975 Indira Gandhi declared an Emergency in the country, prohibited the 
activity of political parties, imposed censorship, and jailed numerous opposition 
leaders.192 During the Emergency years 1975─77 the RSS stood against the limitation 
of civil rights like other democratic organisations. In the parliamentary elections after 
the Emergency in 1977, the Janata party, which was a coalition of four opposition 
parties193, won the Congress party. In 1979 the Janata party split, but a new party called 
Bharatiya Janata Party194 (BJP) was established to replace it.195  
 
The BJP became the major Hindu nationalist party in the course of 1980s. It is 
committed to the concept of ‘One Nation, One People and One Culture’. BJP’s 
conception of the Indian nation bases on the Hindu heritage, which should be culturally 
rooted on Hinduism and the Hindu civilisation. “The unique cultural and social diversity 
in India is woven into larger civilisational fabric by thousands of years of common 
living and common shared values, beliefs, customs, struggles, as well as symbols of 
high degree of unity without uniformity.”196 The nationalist vision is not merely bound 
by the geographical or political identity of Bharat (India) but it also includes the cultural 
heritage, Hindutva. According to this view, minorities should accept the political 
supremacy of the Hindus and the central position of Hinduism in the national 
identity.197 Hindu nationalists think that Nehru’s conception of secularism results in 
political appeasement of minorities, doing great damage to the fabric of national unity 
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in the process. It is not even serving the interests of minorities since they are used by 
politicians as vote banks, and as soon as the elections are over, their interests are 
forgotten. Such a strategy results in the isolation of the minorities, from the mainstream 
of national politics.198 From 1984 on, the BJP began reverting to extreme Hinduism, 
mostly because the Congress Party and Rajiv Gandhi had got upper class Hindus on 
their side, who had traditionally been supporters of the BJP.199 The BJP is trying to 
create a cohesive community, not on the basis of internal cohesiveness but on the basis 
of opposition to a perceived enemy. It is well aware that Hinduism does not have a clear 
structure or shape of homogeneity and therefore the only way to bring the Hindus 
together is to create a feeling of “us” and “them”. By demonising the Muslim minority, 
Hindu nationalist leaders aim to unify a diverse set of Hindus and guarantee their 
political support.200 In the 1984 state elections the BJP won only two seats out of 545 in 
Lok Sabha.201 The rampant rise of Hindu nationalist politics started at the end of the 
1980s. By 1989, they held 85 seats, and in 1991 they were already the second biggest 
party with 119 seats in Lok Sabha.202 In the general elections of 1996, the BJP emerged 
for the first time as the largest political party in India.203 Furthermore, the BJP has not 
been the sole Hindu nationalist political organisation to win elections. The radical Shiv 
Sena204 won municipal elections in Bombay in 1985 and has extended its political 
power throughout other parts of the state of Maharashtra.205 It seems that a multi-party 
system during the 1990s has developed in India.  
 
Hindu nationalism has employed religious symbols on numerous occasions for their 
political or economic purposes. The RSS, for example, consistently uses images of India 
with Hinduism’s Mother Goddess, and exhorts its followers to serve their Hindu nation 
with divine self-sacrifice. Additionally, it reinterprets traditional Hindu festivals in a 
nationalist context. However, the underlying messages in the ideology are essentially 
devoid of religious sentiment of philosophy. The ‘religion’ which Hindu nationalist 
leaders advance contains virtually none of the elements which are considered 
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constitutive of an organised religion. Namely a doctrine, eschatology, and theories on 
morality and divinity.206 Some of the BJP leaders, among them BJP party leader and the 
second Prime Minister of the current government of India207 L. K. Advani, have 
publicly announced that they were irreligious and never went to temples. They posed 
for the educated urban middle classes as “the political Hindus” in a modern, secularised 
(but not secular) and nationalist sense of them.208  
 
The rises of Hindu and Sikh nationalisms are partly linked up with each other. Before 
Sikh a terrorist campaign for a Sikh state started by Sikh leader Jarnail Bhindranwale, 
Hindus and Sikhs had mostly been living harmoniously together, but when 
Bhindranwale sent his supporters to destroy homes of Hindu families and kill Hindus, 
Hindus began to turn towards their own nationalist organisations to seek security. The 
pressure on Hindus had strengthened abroad as well. In Pakistan the majority’s religion, 
Islam, has been declared the state religion and the Hindu-Sikh minorities have been put 
aside in society. This has made Hindus second class citizens in Pakistan. For instance, 
one cannot get an governmental post, if one is not a Muslim. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, 
where Buddhism and the Sinhala language are the hallmarks of the majority 
nationalism, the Tamil speaking Hindu minority was forced to fight for its survival.209 
The Ayodhya Case 
The restoration of Hindu temples destroyed during the medieval Mughal period is the 
most emotive issue employed for communalist mobilisation. The Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad and the Bharatiya Janata Party have selected three sites, Ayodhya, Mathura 
and Varanasi210, for initial agitation. The BJP leaders picked these sites for an obvious 
reason: they would arouse the religious sentiments of the devotees of Ram, Krishna and 
Shiva211. For the BJP, the agitation for the restoration of the temples is a means of 
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creating a sense of solidarity among the Hindus. It identifies the Muslims who had 
committed vandalism in the Hindu shrines as the enemy to fight against.212  
 
Before the situation in Ayodhya communalised, the town used to be a pilgrimage 
destination. Unlike the famous temples in some other Indian cities, in Ayodhya temples 
were open to all, Hindus and non-Hindus, high-caste Hindus and untouchables.213 The 
beginning of the communalisation of the Ayodhya issue dates back to the year 1984, 
when during the high noon of Indira Gandhi’s appeal to the Hindu majority, when the 
VHP announced a campaign to liberate the disputed site of Ramjanmabhumi in 
Ayodhya, allegedly conquered by the Babri Mosque. The demand was revived the 
following year. On February 1st, a district court decreed that the site was indeed that of a 
temple. This action, however, also precipitated massive protests in Muslim communities 
and organisations throughout India.214 The situation got worse when in 1986 the 
government of Rajiv Gandhi promised the Hindus the right to practise their religion in 
Babri Masjid and in 1989 he held his election campaign speech near Ayodhya. By the 
end of the decade, the relation between Hindus and Muslims had worsened and led to 
clashes in the big cities of India.215 Because a political solution turned out to be 
impossible, the Ayodhya issue was taken to courts of different levels. Most of the cases 
ended without a judgement. In 1994, the Supreme Court declared that a place of 
worship is a piece of property and as such is subject to normal civil laws which apply to 
any other piece of property.216 The declaration remains very ambiguous.  
 
In 1989, the RSS launched a well-planned campaign to mobilise people for their 
electoral purposes. It made a door-to-door collection of sanctified bricks in the villages 
for building up the Ram-temple in Ayodhya.217 This would also make it possible to tap 
a “Hindu vote”, even in the remotest villages, by associating the BJP with this ritual 
process. By this the BJP succeeded to better its position in the coming parliamentary 
elections and in 1991 it became the second biggest party in the parliament right after the 
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Congress party.218 In September 1990, the party leader L. K. Advani launched a nation-
wide campaign in support of the movement for the construction of a temple for Ram in 
Ayodhya. He engaged in a 10 000 km ratha yatra, chariot journey, in a car painted to 
look like a war chariot, calling upon people to demonstrate Ram worship. 219  
 
An urge for the communalisation of the Ayodhya issue was the Mandal220 Commission 
Report. This report had advocated affirmative action on behalf of the so-called ‘other 
backward classes’ (OBC’s)221. The Mandal Report, calculating the OBC’s to about 52 
per cent of India’s population, recommended for them a reservation of 27 per cent of 
Central Government employment. The implementation of the report threatened the 
employment of the higher caste Hindus, who so far had been the entitled group in 
government employment because of their education. People of the lower castes or 
casteless people are considered by higher caste Hindus to be pollutive, and therefore 
they were not welcomed to the working places of the higher caste Hindus.222 During the 
1980s and 1990s the unemployment has risen and become a threat to educated people as 
well. Therefore Hindus reacted strongly against the recommendations of the Mandal 
report. The Mandal Commission Report was implemented anyway on 7 August 1990 by 
the Prime Minister V. P. Singh, leader of the Janata Dal223 Party.224  
 
The announcement provoked a violent anti-Mandal agitation by upper-caste youth and 
students among the middle classes of urbanised north India. By bringing caste divisions 
and explosive caste conflicts to the forefront of national politics, the Mandal 
controversy had potentially grave implications for the long-term project of the Hindutva 
movement.225 The acceptance of the Mandal Commission recommendations also 
threatened to split the political base of the BJP. The BJP had been working to expand its 
upper-caste support by utilising the ideology of Hindu nationalism. Its targets had 
switched to the numerically strong and politically mobilised backward castes. The 
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Mandal report pitted these two groups against each other.226 The BJP had no choice but 
to relaunch a campaign called Mandir, because it was threatened with a loss of political 
initiative on account of the Mandal report. The Mandir campaign was supposed to bring 
the entirety of the undifferentiated Hindu community together, keeping out only the 
Muslims, whose patriotism is suspect on account of their supposed extra-territorial 
loyalties.227 The central point in the Mandir campaign was to restore some Hindu 
temples which had been destroyed during the Mughal era, including the Ram-temple in 
Ayodhya.  
 
On 30 October 1990, a few thousand men, largely members or sympathisers of ultra-
Hindu organisations belonging to the RSS, VHP or BJP, converged here in response to 
a call given by militant section of their leadership to liberate the “real” and “only “ site 
of Lord Ram’s birth. This site, they claimed, was the same on which the Babri Masjid of 
Ayodhya stood and where an ancient Ram temple had been destroyed in 1528 by the 
Mughal Emperor Babar’s court. Whether there was a temple or not is still under 
discussion. There are opinions on both sides. Historians from Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in Delhi say that there is no evidence that there has been a temple before the 
mosque. But the BJP defends this by saying that the situation revolves around faith and 
belief, not around facts.228 Liberation meant pulling down the existing structure of the 
Babri Masjid and constructing a Ram temple exactly on the same spot to avenge the 
injustice done to the Hindus in the past. This first attempt to destroy the mosque was 
followed by a second one, which took place on 2 November, but both attempts failed.229 
These attempts were followed by communalist rioting in Jaipur (Rajasthan) and in 
Ahmedabad (Gujarat).230 
 
True to Indian practices, the problem at Ramjanmabhumi231 did not die out or was not 
resolved in earlier incidents. It began to simmer again towards the middle of the year 
1992. The reason for this sudden spurt of activity  was BJP’s lack of success in the 
federal state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The attack that led to the demolition took place on 
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the 6th of December 1992 when the Hindu crowd, gathered in Ayodhya, rushed to the 
mosque armed with hammers, iron rods, bamboos and shovels. They where pelting the 
police with stones and bricks. Nearly all Muslims in the town had left their homes 
before 6 December to be safe, and others fled after hearing the news that the Babri 
Masjid had fallen. Those who were not able to escape in time, died. The destruction was 
systematic and the Hindus got help from the UP police and the local Hindus.232 The 
manner and speed of the destruction of the mosque alone suggest that the episode was 
more than a spontaneous surge by an excited crowd. The demolition of the mosque 
plunged India into the worst outbreak of communalist violence since the partition, with 
1700 dead and 5500 injured. Thousands of Muslims were trying to escape the violence 
even in cosmopolitan cities like Bombay and Calcutta.233 
 
After the demolition, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao dismissed the BJP government in 
the federal states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh, 
and imposed central rule. The dismissals attracted considerable criticism. They were 
seen as an alibi for the inaction of the Congress Party which did not have an idea of how 
to confront the political challenge of the BJP.234 The main leaders of the 
Ramjanmabhumi campaign were arrested, and this included BJP leader Advani. Several 
Hindu nationalist organisations were also banned.235 The Speaker of the parliament 
needed to adjourn the parliament for a week because of constant distractions in the 
plenary sessions by the BJP members.236 When the parliament returned to New Delhi, it 
wrote a resolution on the Ayodhya debacle.  
 
“This house strongly and unequivocally condemns the desecration and 
demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya by and at the instigation of 
forces represented among others by VHP, RSS, and the Bajrang Dal, 
which has caused communal violence in the country. Such act of 
vandalism was carried out not only in violation of the orders of the 
Supreme Court but amounted to an attack on the secular foundations of 
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our country. This House expresses its anguish at the happening and 
wishes to reiterate its resolve that it will ceaselessly endeavour to uphold 
the secular and democratic traditions of our country and for the 
maintenance of the Rule of Law. This House conveys its sympathies and 
condolences to all victims of the tragic incidents which have been caused 
consequent upon the sacrilege at Ayodhya and demands from the 
Government all necessary steps to rehabilitate the affected people. It 
appeals to the people of the country to maintain peace and communal 
harmony.”237 
 
In January 1993, the government proclaimed a presidential ordinance to acquire almost 
68 acres of land in and around the Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Masjid complex in Ayodhya. 
The land is to be handed over to two trusts, one to build a temple and the other a 
mosque.238 
 
The demolished Babri Masjid brought into sharper focus the estranged relations 
between Hindus and Muslims in India today. Moreover, the demolition was widely 
believed by non-religious people to be a frontal attack on the secular Constitution of 
India. The ferocity with which militant Hindus attacked and contested the Constitution 
left many people wondering whether believers and non-believers could live together at 
all. It was earlier thought that the ideology of secularism enabled people with different 
religions and faiths to coexist peacefully.239 The demolition of the mosque did not only 
mobilise the Hindus but also the Muslims of the subcontinent. An Indian journalist has 
noticed how the religious identity of educated Indian Muslims has strengthened. Many 
Muslims that before were agnostics or atheists now speak the language of religion.240  
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Sikh Nationalism 
 
The breakdown of the political order and the rise of communalism in India’s 
economically and strategically important Punjab state, home for most of the country’s 
Sikhs, has taken thousands of lives and resulted in the suspension of democracy and 
constitutional rights in the state. The crisis began with a political agitation by leaders of 
the mainstream Sikh political party in the early 1980s to secure greater rights for the 
state and for the Sikh community. The agitation turned violent in 1983 and 1984, in the 
face of a stalemate in talks between the Akali party leaders and the central government 
headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The political deadlock gave the initiative to 
militants who employed violent tactics to promote their own vision of Punjab as an 
exclusively Sikh entity.241 
 
The crisis culminated in two shattering events: the bloody June 1984 assault on armed 
militants in the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest centre of the Sikh religion; and 
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984 by Sikh members of 
her bodyguard, in revenge for the Golden Temple action. The cycle of violence 
continued with the subsequent massacre of thousands of Sikhs in New Delhi and other 
cities by Hindu mobs, allegedly in some cases with the active participation of Congress 
(I)242 politicians and with complicity of the police. Sikhs are contesting Indian 
secularism by claiming an independent Punjab or Khalistan to become the land of 
Sikhs. 
The Way to a Sikh Identity 
Sikhism as a religion came into being in the fifteenth century, as a protest against the 
degeneration which had crept into Hinduism. It is a syncretic creed combining elements 
of both Hinduism and Islam. Its mystical, monotheistic and egalitarian tenets were laid 
down by Guru Nanak, the first of ten Sikh gurus, who was born in 1469.243 His 
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followers were known as sikhs, learners.244 After Guru Nanak’s death, Sikhism divided 
because of a heritage quarrel. It was in the nineteenth century that a powerful Sikh 
kingdom developed in the area watered by the Indus river and its tributaries (Punjab 
means, literally “five rivers”), and at that time many sectarian groups started to 
emphasise the distinct identity of the Sikhs. But the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 
1839 caused the downfall of the Sikh kingdom, and its annexation to the British Empire 
in 1849.245  
 
The rise and spread of the Hindu revivalist movement in Punjab further forced the Sikhs 
to turn inward and strengthen their own subnational identity. Since then Hindu and Sikh 
nationalisms have been closely interwoven. In the 1870s, the Sikh identity got stronger 
when the modern consolidation of the Keshdhari version of Sikh identity separated from 
Sahajdhari Sikhs.246 Keshdhari or Khalsa Sikhs emphasised the difference between 
Hindus and Sikhs whereas Sahajdhari Sikhs considered Sikhism a sect of Hinduism and 
called themselves Sikh-Hindus.247 The identity was further strengthened by Sikh Khalsa 
college whose aim was to teach Sikh history and generate Sikh employment in Punjab. 
Khalsa college, then speeded up the further establishment of Sikh institutions.248 
Eventually, a Sikh body called Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee (SGPC - 
the peak Sikh temple management body) was established in 1920. The SGPC provided 
material and organisational resources to the Sikh political elites to mobilise the Sikh 
public into a community distinct from that of the Hindus.249 The Sikh party, Akali Dal, 
was founded at the same time to become the political dimension of the SGPC.250 
Through these organisations the ‘new’ identity was cemented and institutionalised. 
Before the year 1947, the SGPC and the Akali Dal, whose participation in national 
politics was largely interlinked with the management and control of Sikh temples or 
gurdwaras, had a non-violent struggle against the government for the control of Sikh 
temples. The British needed to consent to the SGPC in 1922 after Mahatma Gandhi had 
given his support for its demands on the management of the gurdwaras. The Akali Dal 
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and the SGPC gained support in nearly all sections of the Sikh community, which made 
the Akali Dal a movement of masses.251 They were particularly successful in the rural 
areas.252 After the agreement on the management of the temples had been reached, 
Sikhs turned their political concentration on the establishment of their own electorates, 
and later on their own state.253  
 
The partition of the subcontinent split Punjab down the middle and caused some 2 
million Sikhs to abandon their homes in West Punjab, now part of Pakistan. Sikhs from 
Pakistan settled primarily in the Indian part of Punjab and in nearby New Delhi. The 
partition and its aftermath left a legacy of bitterness and had a negative effect on Hindu-
Sikh relations. During the partition hundreds of thousands of people died.254 Sikhs saw 
Muslims achieve a separate state (Pakistan), while they ended up as a minority in the 
new East Punjab state.255 Hindus occupied the political professions in the central 
administration, and they refused to form a Sikh homeland as Hindus were the majority 
in the state. There was also an aggressive communalist mentality displayed by some 
Punjabi Hindus.256 Already in 1944, a Sikh Conference had suggested that a committee 
be established to look into the possibility of creating an independent Sikh state. The 
Akali leader, Tara Singh, declared that Sikhs, too, were a nation and they would not be 
slaves of Pakistan or Hindustan.257 Earlier British policies, such as the preference for 
Khalsa Sikhs in the army and the police recruitment258, higher investments in 
infrastructure, and intervention in land tenure relationships, had accentuated rivalries 
among the main religious and caste groups. The partition accentuated this tendency. 259 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Sikh politics came to revolve around the demand for Punjabi 
Suba (Punjabi state), a linguistically determined entity compact enough to give the 
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Sikhs a majority260. The demand paralleled those of other linguistic groups throughout 
India, but it met with stiffer resistance.261 The State Reorganisation Commission 
submitted its report in 1955 stating that the majority of the Punjabis were opposed to the 
demand for a Punjabi-speaking state. The most crucial part of this ‘majority’ was 
actually the articulate section of Hindus in the Punjabi-speaking zone.262 The Akali Dal 
responded to the refusal with violence. Protestors used the Golden Temple as their 
headquarters, but the police entered the temple and arrested 10,000 protestors.263 After 
this in 1956, the Akali Dal managed to negotiate a scheme which came to be known as 
the Regional Formula. Punjab did not become a Punjabi-speaking state, but it could 
concentrate on the promotion of the religious, educational, cultural, social and economic 
interests of the Sikhs.264 By 1963, several linguistic- based states and federal territories 
had been created through territorial reorganisations, but Punjab was not one of them 
because of the Hindu majority.265  
 
In March 1966, the Congress Working Group recommended to the Union Government 
that a state with Punjabi as a state language be created. In reaction there were strikes, 
murders and all other acts of violence, mainly committed by Hindu nationalists.266 The 
Parliament nevertheless decided in favour of the reorganisation of Punjab on a linguistic 
basis.267 The eastern districts of the previous Punjab state, which were predominantly 
Hindu in religion and Hindi-speaking in language, were split off to create the new states 
of Haryana and Himanchal Pradesh. Sikhs became the majority in the state of Punjab 
with a population of 60.2%, and Hindus a minority (37.6%).268 But demographic 
balance still did not favour the main Sikh communalist party, the faction-ridden Akali 
Dal. The nationally dominant Congress Party remained also the strongest party in 
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Punjab.269 The Akali Dal web-page comments the reorganisation followingly: “Punjabi 
Subi was carved out to appease a small band of selfish and treacherous; power hungry 
and greedy; and the anti-Sikh Akali Dal leaders”. The web site is very critical against 
the leaders of Akali Dal. The party claims on the page that the leaders have betrayed the 
Sikh nation by signing contracts with the Congress party and by not defending the Sikh 
nation enough.270 The Akali Dal sees that the formation of Punjabi Suba is still 
unfinished. It is seeking for an independent state for the Sikh nation, and the leaders 
have not acted effectively for this aspiration. Even the attack on the Golden Temple and 
the massacre of Sikhs are proofs for the need of Khalistan, an independent state for the 
Sikhs.271 
 
In the 1970s, Akali Dal split into two factions, the dominant group led by the Akali 
Dal’s president, Harchand Singh Longowal, and the other led by the Akali leader and 
former president of the party, Jagdev Singh Talwindi. The two groups at times joined 
forces, but the campaign was marked by a rivalry between them, which led to an 
escalation and contradiction in demands and statements.272 Several developments in the 
1970s and early 1980s caused the Akali-led campaign, for essentially political and 
economic goals, to shift towards an emphasis on demands with fundamentalist religious 
overtones, purely for the benefit of the Sikhs, and towards the emergence of a violent 
secessionist movement.273 This can be seen in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution from the 
year 1973, which states the demand for a Sikh nation and calls for a dramatic devolution 
of power from the centre to the states.274 
 
Is Sikh communalism then also nationalism? Can a religious community be a nation? 
The Sikh movement started as a fundamentalist campaign protecting its own religion 
and later demanded political power and the right for an own state. However, of the 
many Indian religious communities, the Sikhs are one of the communities that possess 
the strongest sense of of their own identity and community. In my opinion the Sikh 
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separatism meets the conditions for a nation. The Sikh community is a new entity, a 
socio-political community in modernity, which was imagined as a continuity from a 
hoary past and tradition during the nineteenth and twentieth century. They are a group 
of people living in a well-defined geographical area, possessing an own distinct and 
separate identity that emphasises a common language, visible cultural and religious 
symbols, as the cloth tied around the head of the male Sikhs, and a common religion. 
  
Sikh communalism is also called Khalsa nationalism. All the male converts to the 
Khalsa adopted the surname Singh, or lion, which is an important part of the separate 
Sikh identity. During the agitation campaign in the twentieth century, Sahajdhari Sikhs 
had either adopted Khalsa tenets or chosen to be regarded as Hindus.275 But despite the 
development of a Sikh consciousness and the drawing of communal boundaries between 
Sikhs and Hindus over several decades, there remained much in common between the 
Sikhs and a large body of Punjabi Hindus: a common identification with the same caste 
groups, a shared spoken language and culture, common social and historical traditions 
and intermarriage. Sikh communal separation based essentially on religious 
differentiation.276 
Operation Bluestar and the Assassination of Indira Gandhi 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale gained power in the beginning of the 1980s and became the 
leader of Sikh extremist movement. He studied in a small centre for Sikh orthodoxy and 
religious teaching. In 1971 he became the head priest of the institution. From the outset 
of his new responsibilities Bhindranwale emerged as a rigid champion of Sikh 
orthodoxy. He toured Sikh villages and baptised hundreds, and paid special attention to 
the traditional arms of a Sikh man and rapidly assumed the role of a militant messiah.277 
Bhindranwale wanted to integrate Punjab under Sikhism, and for this purpose, he 
occupied the Golden Temple of Amritsar, the holiest shrine of Sikhs, and made it a 
fortress making use of its immunity as a sacred place. The supporters of  Bhindranwale 
served him and the faith by going on with the mission of killing Hindus. Motor-scooter 
commandos drove to the villages and shot people, buses were stopped and the Hindus in 
them killed. The violence started to escalate.278  
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The impetus for Operation Bluestar is in the year 1980, when the central government 
declared President’s Rule in Punjab and eight other states whose governments were still 
dominated by parties other that Indira Gandhi’s own. This dissolved the states’ 
legislative assemblies and required new elections. In Punjab, new elections managed to 
bring a government to power that achieved Mrs Gandhi’s trust.279 In the first half of the 
1980s, the Congress party helped Bhindranwale gain political power, hoping that his 
religious influence among the Sikh masses would be greater than that of the Akalis. In a 
way, there was a common interest between the Congress party and the Bhindranwale 
group, as both sought to destroy the power base of moderate Akali leadership. For Mrs 
Gandhi, this would have paved the way for capturing Hindu votes in North India.280 But 
Bhindranwale turned against his promoters to overcome their hegemony, and outdid the 
Akalis with his strong campaign for the acceptance of the religious and economic 
demands. In early 1984, Bhindranwale broke with the Akalis; by then he had became a 
phenomenon in his own right.281  
 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wanted to prevent the possibility of Bhindranwale 
achieving more political power, by undertaking an attack against the Akalis and 
Bhindranwale. The excuse for the assault was found in a peaceful road blockage 
organised by the Akali Dal. They wanted to prevent the movement of foodgrains out of 
Punjab by blocking roads and rail traffic as a protest against the economic policy of the 
central government. Indira Gandhi made the decision to attack on her own and kept her 
plans in secret until the end.282 She held a speech on the situation in Punjab on June 2, 
1984, but she did not refer in any way to the attack, which took place a couple of days 
later. Instead, Indira Gandhi suggested that the Akali Dal sit at the negotiations table 
with her to find a solution, because in a democracy the right and only way to settle 
problems is through discussions.283 According India’s noted journalist, Khushwant 
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Singh, the President of India, Zail Singh, was kept in the dark about the plans for an 
attack on the Temple.284  
 
The attack, called Operation Bluestar, began on June 5, 1984. First the water and 
electricity supply to the Golden Temple was stopped. The next day the army entered the 
Golden Temple in Amritsar and blindly killed all the people who came in their way. 
Several other gurdwaras in Punjab were also taken over by the army. Most of the 
victims were innocent pilgrims, including women and children. The estimations of the 
casualties rise up to 5000 civilians.285 The Times reported that all the bodies had been 
quickly cremated, and therefore it is hard to estimate the real number of casualties.286 
An Amritsar witness, a journalist of the Associated Press, puts the death toll at 1000, of 
which 800 were militants and 200 soldiers.287  
 
A month after Operation Bluestar, the government published its version of the events in 
the White Paper on the Punjab Agitation. In addition to the one-sided narration, it had 
many factual inaccuracies. Its main theme was that the Akali agitation generated 
Bhindranwale’s terrorism and, since Akali could not control it, the government had no 
option but to stamp it out. The White Paper put the entire responsibility for 
Bhindranwale’s misdeeds on the Akalis without mentioning the government’s role in 
building Bhindranwale up. The most glaring inaccuracy in the report was its estimate of 
human casualties and the damage to sacred property. According to the report, the 
‘civilian-terrorists’ killed 554 persons. Army casualties were estimated at 92. The 
government never bothered to publish the names of those killed, nor anything to refute 
the evidence that quite a large number of those captured were executed in cold blood.288 
A member of the parliament criticised the White Paper in a parliament discussion by 
saying that it was only a collection and a compilation of some of the reports from 
newspapers.289 According to Jugdep S. Chima, the real reasons why Prime Minister 
Gandhi ordered the army to attack the Golden Temple were that she wanted to end the 
perceived Khalistan terrorist threat, as well as the intensified Akali mobilisation and the 
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increased level of political violence in Punjab, but also that she feared the possibility of 
losing the elections in four predominantly Hindu Northern states in the coming 
months.290 Indira Gandhi herself said in an interview, which she gave three weeks 
before her death, that the reason for the problems in Punjab lay in the politics of the 
Akali Dal. The Akalis did not fight against the terrorism and therefore the militants 
were able to intrude into the temple and make it a storage for their arsenal.291 
 
After the operation, Sikhs came to be treated as suspects, harassed and discriminated 
against. Since the army was ordered to stamp out terrorism, it continued with another 
operation called Woodrose. Village after village was surrounded, the houses of Sikhs 
were searched for arms, and Sikh young men were taken for questioning, beaten up and 
tortured. Far from stamping out terrorism and the feeling of separatism, operations 
Bluestar and Woodrose gave rise to feelings of alienation and turned hundreds of young 
Sikh men and women into terrorists. Many of them crossed the border into Pakistan and 
made it a base for their operations. They returned with sophisticated arms, and they 
were able to perpetrate acts of terrorism because after the army brutalities the peoples 
sympathies were with them.292 On October 1, 1984, the army withdrew from the Golden 
Temple. It was handed over to the SGPC and the reconstruction started. The army 
action widened the gulf between the Hindus who had welcomed it and the Sikhs who 
had not, and accelerated the movement for Khalistan.293 
 
After Operation Bluestar, Indira Gandhi became the main target of terrorism because 
she had demolished the most sacred place of the Sikhs, the Golden Temple. On 31st of 
October, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two closest bodyguards, who were both 
Sikhs. She had been advised to change the bodyguards after Operation Bluestar, 
because they had both had contacts with Sikh extremists, but Indira Gandhi had refused 
to do so saying that she will count on the loyalty of her bodyguards. On the same day 
after the assassination, president Zial Singh designated Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv 
Gandhi as the next Prime Minister of India.294 The Indian intellectual Salman Rushdie 
criticised the designation of Rajiv Gandhi after the assassination by writing that “The 
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cloud of courtiers enveloped Mrs. Gandhi, and it would be a great advance if it were 
now to lose power. For this reason it seems to me quite wrong for Congress (I) to 
choose, as its new leader, a man as untried, and as unsuited for high office as Rajiv 
Gandhi; it is time for India to assert, and for its ruling party to demonstrate, that the 
nation is not owned by any one family, no matter how illustrious. The Queen is dead; 
vive la république.”295 
 
The universality of Sikh resentment was reflected in a spontaneous celebration of the 
assassination of Prime Minister in the towns and villages of Punjab. An equally 
spontaneous anger over her assassination resulted in violence in Delhi and in some other 
cities in India.296 ‘Sikhs were sought out and burned to death. Children were killed, 
shops looted, cars burnt and markets and houses destroyed. Trains were stopped, and 
Sikhs were picked out and murdered.’297  
 
The release of Akali politicians in 1985 began a renewed and intensified phase of 
competition for leadership among them. Having voluntarily surrendered to the military 
authorities during the confrontation at the Golden Temple, they now sought to establish 
their credibility within their community by rapidly adopting militant postures. Sant 
Harchand Singh Longowal refused to condemn Sikh terrorists and the assassins of 
Indira Gandhi. He also expressed his sympathy and support for the families of those 
killed during Operation Bluestar. His former rival, Jagdev Singh Talwindi, also became 
a supporter of Sikh militancy.298 
  
There was an attempt to solve the crisis in July 1985, with an accord (Rajiv Gandhi-
Sant Longowal Accord) between the government and the leader of the mainline Sikh 
Akali Dal party on the termination of Akali agitation. Rajiv’s politics of accommodation 
and reconciliation had won. However, a complete restoration of normalcy in the state 
was not possible until it was brought under the control of a popularly elected 
government. In September 1985, state elections brought a Sikh government to power in 
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Punjab.299 Just before the election, Sant Longowal was assassinated by Sikh extremists 
because of his moderate politics.300 Throughout 1986 and early 1987, the elected 
moderate Sikh government (headed by Surjit Singh Barnala) suffered a steady erosion 
of authority within the Sikh community and a progressive loss of confidence on the part 
of the central government. The collapse of the political settlement stemmed from the 
failure of Rajiv Gandhi’s government. It faced problems of its own with a Hindu 
backlash, because Hindus were acting as the brakes in the agreement. In May 1987, 
amidst escalating violence and a rise in the number of militants, Rajiv Gandhi 
suspended the legislature and reimposeed the direct rule of the central government.301 
Both this action and a new surge of extremist violence appeared to foreclose any 
possibility of achieving an early settlement in the conflict. To end the violence, the 
government of India released in March 1988 40 Sikh extremists and 5 priests who had 
been convicted after Operation Bluestar. But after some time the extremists started to 
arm the Temple again and Rajiv Gandhi needed to react to that. He called up Operation 
Black Thunder. This time things worked out better. Rajiv used pressure as the tactic and 
the terrorists capitulated.302      
Internal factors 
The internal dynamics of the Punjab crisis derive from the changes in Punjab’s political 
economy emanating from the green revolution. The green revolution transformed 
Punjab’s largely subsistence farming to profit-oriented agriculture. It was carried out in 
Punjab during the late 1960s and 1970s and it produced a manifold increase in 
agricultural output but also increased the costs of agricultural input. However, the 
benefits of the green revolution did not distribute equally. Along with the green 
revolution there was a revolution in education in Punjab, as the processes of agricultural 
modernisation began to allow for the liberation of many children from farm labour. 
Unfortunately, higher education did not translate into economic gains for many of the 
rural Sikh youth, as distortions particularly in the disparity between agricultural growth 
and a retarded industrial sector led to significant levels of unemployment among 
educated youth.303 The migration of young, often educated Sikh men was beginning to 
increase in 1981, as the division of landholdings, the unavailability of industrial jobs, 
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and a desire for adventure and a better life outside of India caused a sense of 
restlessness in rural areas. They also faced competition from migrant labourers, who 
were almost all Hindus. A large segment of Punjabis were in the early 1980s ready for 
mobilisation, agitation, and possibly glorified violence, given the right catalytic 
agents.304  
 
The green revolution so produced socio-economic conditions affecting various producer 
classes in the state. These conditions led to increased societal dissatisfaction and tension 
that was channelled through the Akali Dal agitation. The Akali-elite mobilisation 
combined with societal unrest, increasingly displayed Sikh nationalistic rhetoric and 
tendencies. The mobilisation was possible through the linking of the political frustration 
of Akali elites with the religious symbolism offered by Bhindranwale and the discontent 
of large segments of Sikh community. The animosity of both the Sikh political elites 
and the Sikh community became directed toward the Congress (I)-led central 
government, whose centralising political and economic policies were perceived as being 
the primary sources of Punjab’s political, economic and religious problems.305  
 
Robin Jeffrey concentrates in his analysis on the modernising impact of the green 
revolution. To him, it accelerated the emergence of the mass society: face-to-face 
village communities disintegrated; urbanisation, consumerism and mass literacy inflated 
expectations; ethnic identities became firmer emblems of competition; rootlessness, 
alienation and graduate unemployment nurtured messianic tendencies, especially 
fundamentalism; and above all, a revolution took place in communications. 
Modernisation played a large part in shaping the Sikh unrest, which ultimately led to the 
storming of the Golden Temple, Mrs Gandhi’s assassination and the communalist 
violence in Northern India.306 Gurharpal Singh argues that Jeffrey’s mass society thesis 
is based on a few selected social indicators which do not warrant such a construction. 
But Singh does not give any specific examples of these insufficient indicators or give a 
better explanation.307 
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Political Implications  
The Akali Dal Party has usually been seen as non-violent. It has organised several non-
violent campaigns during the independence. It has also been interwoven with the Indian 
government through the 20th century and followed a secular strategy. This strategy was 
thus a double-edged sword; as long as the Akalis could form coalition governments, the 
strategy paid dividends. However, the resounding defeat of the Congress Party in the 
1972 elections put the Akali moderates in a vulnerable position, as the more 
nationalistic Akalis urged a return to a more Sikh-based orientation.308 The Akali Dals 
aimed to increase the powers of states enormously at the expense of the federal 
government.309 From the perspective of the Akali moderates, the Punjab crisis was due 
to the refusal of the government to grant states autonomy, and from a deep-seated Hindu 
bias against the Sikhs. The central government has failed to make appropriate 
concessions to the Akalis’ demands regarding issues such as limiting the central 
government only to the areas of defence, foreign affairs, communications, railways and 
currency. Akalis also demanded the recognition of the Sikhs as a nation rather than a 
religious community.310  
 
Akali Dal represents the moderate fraction of Sikh nationalism, unlike the 
Bhindranwale group, who were communalists. From the perspective of these Sikh 
militants, the roots of the problem lie in the suppression of the Sikhs by the government 
and their betrayal by the Akali political leaders. Operation Bluestar was not a security 
operation, as the central government says, but a clash of two nations, the first war for 
Khalistan.311 The extremists also claim that Hindus have shown through their support 
for the central government that they are fundamentally anti-Sikh. The government 
showed in the Golden Temple attack and in the Delhi riots that it was prepared to 
conduct “genocide” against Sikhs. The only answer to this is to seek an independent 
Khalistan, and to employ violence both to attack the government and its allies, and to 
make all Sikhs realise that they must choose to be either for or against Khalistan. The 
groups referred to as extremists range from religious fundamentalists to militant 
political/paramilitary groups, such as the All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), 
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and openly paramilitary or terrorist groups, such as the Khalistan Commandos Force 
and the Dashmesh Regiment. The militants stand for the construction of a theocratic 
state and the expulsion of the forces of the central government.312 
 
Punjabi Hindus have long opposed the ambitions of Sikh leaders to give the state an 
exclusively Sikh identity. From a Hindu perspective, the Sikhs are seeking to create a 
state in which Hindus would be at the mercy of the majority. Even where there are 
shared class or economic interests, Hindus feel that Sikhs can no longer be trusted due 
to the communalist polarisation. For many Hindus, the answer lies in greater Hindu 
solidarity and organisation, and support for Hindu chauvinist parties. Others continue to 
put their faith in the Congress party and the central government’s paramilitary forces to 
protect their interests. For Balraj Madhok, an ideologue of the BJP, the roots of the 
Punjab problem lie in the Muslim connection. According to him, Muslim imperialism 
had attempted to divide Sikhs and Hindus – the Sikhs being a militarised wing of 
Punjab’s Hindu society.313  
 
The crisis has an important regional security dimension, due to the allegations by India 
that Pakistan has aided the separatists with weapons and training. Claims by Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi that the crisis derives mainly from the efforts of Pakistan to 
destabilise India lack persuasiveness, given the obvious and well documented domestic 
political origins of the conflict. While the Punjab crisis is essentially a domestically and 
internally produced political problem, India has long complained that Sikh separatists 
and terrorists are aided by Pakistan. There is some evidence on the separatist forces 
regularly crossing the border between India and Pakistan, following routes used by 
smugglers. Pakistan denies that it has played such a role and has agreed to co-operate 
against terrorism, including joint efforts to control illegal border-crossing. Punjab is 
strategically very important to India, because losing Punjab would create enormous 
defence liabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan, especially since Punjab constitutes a vital land 
corridor to Indian controlled Kashmir.  
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Kashmiri nationalism 
 
The departure of the British from the Indian subcontinent and the partition into two 
successor states, India and Pakistan, were the starting points for the dispute on Kashmir. 
During the last five decades, there have already been three wars and innumerable 
uprisings and riots. And so far, the end of the dispute is not perceivable. The dispute 
started as a struggle between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir, but later 
it has changed more into a people’s wish to rule their own life. This is closely connected 
to the Indian government’s denial of their regional identities. The Kashmiri identity 
developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and led to a Kashmiri 
nationalist movement that started to demand the right to independence.      
Kashmiri Identity 
There are several inconsistencies that make the definition of Kashmiri identity 
problematic. Firstly, the state of Jammu and Kashmir consists of three different parts: 
the Hindu majority in Jammu (62 per cent), Muslim majority in Kashmir (94 per cent) 
and Buddhist majority in Ladakh (52 per cent)314. Secondly, Kashmir does not only 
consist of different religious groups but also of different ethnic groups: the Buddhist of 
Ladakh are Tibetans, the Hindus in Jammu are Dogras and the Muslims in Jammu are 
Punjabis. These different parts of Jammu and Kashmir declare that they are all 
combined by a separate Kashmiri ethnicity, Kashmiriyat.315 However, Kashmir has 
always been different from the other parts of India. The distinct culture, language and 
customs within the area of Kashmir have remained so on the account of the high 
mountains that cocoon it. Religions have changed in Kashmir but they have still 
coexisted there in peace.316  
 
Kashmiri identity has developed as a consequence of different foreign rulers and the 
discrimination these rulers exercised against Kashmiris. The discrimination was mostly 
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directed against the Muslims because the rulers of Kashmir have been powerful Hindus 
and Sikhs. The complex relationship between India and Kashmir has also sharpened the 
identity.However, Balraj Puri, a political activist in Jammu and a member of the Jammu 
and Kashmir National Conference, argues that Kashmiri identity has eroded during the 
battle for greater autonomy and independence, because the central government has not 
conceded any autonomy to Kashmir, which then has matched with the refusal of 
Kashmir to allow Jammu any right to autonomy within the state. This has created 
tension between the different regions within the state.317 The Kashmiri identity is a 
strong one. one can still meet people in Delhi, who identify themselves as Kashmiris, 
even though they have not been born there.  
 
There are three different kinds of nationalisms that use Kashmir as their battlefield. 
Those are the religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, the secular Indian 
nationalism and the ethnic Kashmiri nationalism318. In the Kashmiri nationalist 
movement, the Muslims of the Kashmiri Valley have had the leading role. Hindus in 
Jammu have been under the attack of Muslims and they firmly support Kashmir’s 
position within the Indian Union. Ladakh, then, is a very remote area and mostly 
controlled by China. Thus, the discussion of Kashmiri nationalism refers to the Muslims 
in the Valley of Kashmir. Jammu has always been strongly attached to India, because 
the majority of its inhabitants are Hindus. However, I refrain from calling the 
nationalism in Kashmir Muslim nationalism. All the Muslims of India do not live in 
Kashmir and all of them do not support autonomy or independence of Kashmir, and 
many of the people, who consider themselves Kashmiris, are in fact Hindus of their 
religion. Therefore it would be misleading to call Kashmiri nationalism Muslim 
nationalism. Kashmir nationalism is also more secular than religious. It aims at 
independence but not necessarily on religious terms.  
The Rise of Kashmiri Nationalism 
The era of foreign rule began in Kashmir in 1586, when the Mughal emperor, Akbar, 
attached it to his empire.319 During the Muslim era, there was hardly any discrimination, 
but unluckily the Mughal administration was terminated by the Afghans, who ruled 
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Kashmir harshly from 1753 until the early nineteenth century. In 1819, five hundred 
years of Muslim rule ended, when Maharaja Ranjit Singh extended his Sikh empire to 
the area and drove the Afghans out. The situation of Kashmiri Muslims started to 
worsen in 1846, when a Dogra320 ruler Gulab Singh, assumed to himself the power with 
the help of the British in the Treaty of Amritsar. The Dogras occupied the posts in the 
administration and the army. Muslims became, in practice, second class citizens.321 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, many Hindu associations were established which 
then inspired Muslims to organise themselves. In 1905, the Anjuman-i-Nusrat-ul-Islam 
was formed to preach Islam and to improve education and social justice for Kashmiri 
Muslims. The Anjuman formed councils and committees for communication and 
established the Islamia High School in Srinagar. Following the Anjuman, other Muslim 
organisations emerged in Kashmir, including one in Jammu. At first these organisations 
were strictly social, but during the 1920s, Muslim organisations became more political 
as a result of rising consciousness and increase in higher education among Kashmiri 
youth. These organisations started to oppose Maharaja’s autocracy.322  
 
The bitterness of the Muslims against the Dogras and the colonial rule broke out to the 
streets in July 1931. After the incident, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah took a leading role 
in the creation of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, which began to 
organise opposition to both British and Dogra rule. The Muslim Conference was 
dissolved in 1939 because of internal divisions, but Sheikh Abdullah formed the Jammu 
and Kashmir National Conference to replace it. By doing this, he wanted to stress the 
secular and Kashmiri character of the organisation. Abdullah and the National 
Conference suggested an agreement with the aims of the Indian nationalist movement 
led by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.323 Abdullah “saw the relationship with 
India as the best available option in the circumstances; as a partnership inspired by 
common ideals of democracy, autonomy, secularism and socio-political reform; not 
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only subservience.”324 Sheikh Abdullah can be considered the father of Kashmiri 
identity and the first Kashmiri nationalist. He spoke eagerly for the rights of the 
Kashmiri people. 
 
The dispute began in 1947, when the subcontinent was divided into India and Pakistan 
according to the two-nation-theory325. The British performed the partition according to 
the geographical continuity and the religious majority in the state. The Hindu majority 
states were to be part of India and the Muslim majority states part of Pakistan. Kashmir 
posed serious problems because it consists of three different parts: the Muslim majority 
in the Valley of Kashmir, the Hindu majority in Jammu and the Buddhist majority in 
Ladakh. Even though Kashmir was home to a very substantial Muslim majority326 and 
was contiguous with Pakistan as well as with India, it refused to be attached to Pakistan. 
The reason for this was that at that time it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, Hari 
Singh.327 At first, Maharaja Hari Singh was seriously considering independence as an 
option for Kashmir, but he considered co-operation with Sheikh Abdullah to reach this 
goal unthinkable. In addition to this, India offered wide autonomy to Kashmir, which 
was a more tempting alternative for Hari Singh than the accession to Pakistan. Both the 
creator of Pakistan, M. A. Jinnah,328 and the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
believed that Kashmir had to be a part of Pakistan or India. The political confrontation 
between the Muslim League and the Congress Party became more severe, and in 1946, 
communalist violence between Sikhs and Muslims, and Hindus and Muslims, gradually 
increased.329  
Territorial Dispute 
The first war between India and Pakistan started in October 1947, when Pathan tribal 
forces, with the help of Pakistan, attacked Kashmir with the mission of liberating it. To 
save Jammu and Kashmir from the accession to Pakistan, Maharaja Hari Singh asked 
the central government in Delhi to help. The last viceroy of India for the British Empire, 
Louis Mountbatten, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Deputy Prime Minister of India, Sardar 
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Vallabhai Patel, agreed that Jammu and Kashmir had to accede, at least temporarily, to 
India before Indian troops could be sent for the rescue operation. This came to be 
known as the Instrument of Accession.330 Both India and Pakistan agreed that the final 
decision on the status of Kashmir would be made by a plebiscite.331 As Indian forces put 
a stop to the Pathans’ advance, the Pakistani army gradually became more involved. 
The conflict led to a war between India and Pakistan. Although the war was brought to 
the United Nations (UN) in January 1948 at the request of India, a cease-fire agreement 
did not come into effect until 1 January 1949. In 1948 arrived the newly formed United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)332. The United Nations’ Security 
Council also supported the idea of a plebiscite and the demilitarisation of the area.333 
The cease-fire line, which was supervised by the UN, turned into a line of control. This 
subsequently became the de facto border between India and Pakistan which remains 
today. More than a third of what had hitherto been called Jammu and Kashmir came 
under the control of Pakistan and is now more commonly known as Azad Kashmir in 
Pakistan and Pakistani Occupied Kashmir by the Indian Government. Not surprisingly, 
the part remaining in India is referred to Indian Occupied Kashmir by the Pakistani 
Government.334 There were plans to set Kashmir under the auspices of the United States 
of America, but this failed because of the resistance of the Soviet Union.335 Diplomats 
have speculated about the possible outcome of the plebiscite and have noted that the 
elite in Kashmir would have voted for the accession to Pakistan. The farmers, on the 
other hand, would probably have voted for India, as Sheikh Abdullah had successfully 
pulled through a landreform by splitting up farms into smaller ones and so helping 
small-scale farmers.336 Pakistan had counted that if the plebiscite had taken place after 
the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, 90 % of the Kashmiris would have voted in favour of 
Pakistan.337 
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After the independence of India Sheikh Abdullah became the Prime Minister of Jammu 
and Kashmir. He made the life of maharadza Hari Singh so unbearable in Kashmir that 
he needed to leave Kashmir in 1949.338 Abdullah was arrested in 1953 because he had 
started to support the idea of an independent Kashmir in the early 1950s.339 After 
Abdullah’s dismissal, the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir under the new 
Kashmiri leader, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, ratified a new constitution declaring 
Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India.340 According to India, the accession was 
irrevocable and there would be no need for plebiscite.341  
 
There was a round of discussions between India and Pakistan concerning the situation in 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1963,342 but they were not able to ease the tensions between 
Hindus and Muslims which continued through the 1950s and 1960s and ended in a 
second war on 1st of September 1965. The UN reacted quickly and the war lasted only 
three weeks343. The war based on three assumptions: (1) that widespread support existed 
in Indian-occupied Kashmir for waging a guerrilla campaign; (2) that India would not 
be inclined to launch a large-scale military offensive against Azad Kashmir; and (3) that 
India would not cross the international frontier in either East or West Pakistan. The 
assumptions did not have solid ground under them and India countered the attack with 
military force.344 Strategically, the war did not have any results, but politically it was a 
big mistake for Pakistan. Pakistan had started the war because it had assumed that India 
would not be able to respond to this because it had suffered a defeat in the war against 
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China. In spite of the hopes of Pakistan, the Kashmiris chose a union with India rather 
than with Pakistan. India and Pakistan both claimed that the other was responsible for 
starting the war345. It was not until 1972 that Pakistan admitted its defeat and made a 
peace treaty with India in Simla.346 The Simla Agreement was an attempt to restore 
some order into Indo-Pakistani relations, and for a while it also succeeded to bring an 
end to Kashmir as being an active territorial dispute.347  
 
Jammu and Kashmir’s first free and fair elections were held in 1977, when the National 
Conference and the Congress Party met as political equals. The role of Prime Minister 
Morarji Desai has also been emphasised in the democratic development of Jammu and 
Kashmir. He strengthened security in Jammu and Kashmir so that fair elections could 
be held. In the end, the Congress (I) won 11 seats and became the third largest party in 
the assembly, the Janata Party, which just had won the national elections, won 13 seats, 
and the National Conference secured a majority with 47 of the assembly’s 75 seats. The 
Muslim party, Jamaat-i-Islami, won only one seat. 348   
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s the level of violence and turbulence was insignificant 
compared to the times before, and it would seem that the political conditions did breed 
integration.349 This was because there was no war, but the violence in Jammu and 
Kashmir still remained endemic.350 The war on Bangladesh in 1971 had changed the 
political situation so that independence for Kashmir was no longer a possibility. 
Internally Delhi reopened negotiations with the newly appointed Prime Minister of 
Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, who had been released from prison and house-
arrest, and signed an agreement in 1975, accepting that Kashmir was a constituent unit 
of the Union of India, and that no law made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir seeking to change it would take effect unless the Bill received the consent 
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the president of India.351 After his release, he turned back to become a friend of India, 
possibly because neither Pakistan nor the international community was able to support 
the independence.352 The agreement put Kashmir under the central power of India, and 
the autonomy of Kashmir became even more restricted, because it took away a great 
deal of the remaining strength from the Article 370 of the Constitution.353 The Indian 
Constitution has two articles which are important for the status of Jammu and Kashmir. 
In Article I the state is deemed to be an integral part of the Indian Union, but in Article 
370 it is given a special status by means of “temporary provisions with respect to the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir”, which effectively limits the power of the Indian 
Parliament there to three matters, namely defence, external affairs and 
communications.354  
The Turn Against India 
When Sheikh Abdullah passed away in 1982, his son, Farooq Abdullah, took over the 
party leadership. Farooq Abdullah inherited a popular but internally fractured party. The 
National Conference was torn because of Sheikh Abdullah’s decision to let his son 
succeed him instead of his daughter’s husband Ghulam Mohammed Shah. The 
Congress (I) suggested co-operation to the National Conference in the 1983 elections, 
but the alliance was avoided because of the fear of the NC that it could be marginalised. 
The campaign was still undertaken on a secular basis and both the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Muslim Party, Jamaat-i-Islami, were wiped out in 
the election. The BJP argued that Jammu and Kashmir should lose its special status in 
the Constitution and be totally integrated with the Indian Union, and the Jamaat-e-
Islami advocated the accession to Pakistan. In the elections, the National Conference 
won 46 of the 75 seats and the Congress 26.355  
 
The central government removed Farooq Abdullah from power because it claimed that 
he had not taken necessary and stern measures against the separatist movements. It is 
more likely that the real reason for this was that the Congress (I) saw Abdullah as a 
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threat to national security. But there were two other levels of conflict that affected the 
situation: one between the state and the central government and the other between Indira 
Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah. There had been a deterioration in the state-centre 
relations because of Abdullah’s May 1983 decision to join an alliance of regional 
parties from around India – the so called Opposition Conclave – as the election 
campaign in Jammu and Kashmir was concluding. Indira Gandhi saw this as a national 
anti-Congress (I) alliance.356    
 
The separatist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir became salient during the 1980s. The 
extremist parties gradually but increasingly became more successful in using region and 
religion as the basis for political mobilisation. In March 1986 the situation was already 
so bad that Governor’s Rule357 was imposed in Jammu and Kashmir. Just before the 
expiry of the six-month term of Governor’s Rule, Abdullah entered a power-sharing 
agreement with the Congress (I). In November the agreement was crowned by the 
central government’s decision to reinstall Abdullah as Chief Minister. Such frequent 
changes, in forms of loose alliances, Governor’s Rule, and central government 
intervention, dramatically eroded the belief of the people in democracy in Kashmir.358 
In Kashmiris’ eyes, Farooq became an adjunct of the Congress Party, and he possessed 
little legitimacy.359  
 
In the elections of 1987, the National Conference and the Congress (I) formed an 
election coalition to create a political monopoly and capture all the votes in the 
election.360 Only a few days after it became clear that Farooq Abdullah and the 
Congress (I) were forming an alliance, a hitherto unknown organisation, the Muslim 
United Front (MUF), started to join the opposition forces of the NC and the Congress 
(I).361 For return, the NC-Congress (I) cartel fingered the election outcome because the 
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majority of the Kashmiris had turned to support the MUF. The election fraud was the 
trigger that led Kashmiris from the Valley to cross the border into Pakistan and enrol in 
extreme organisations. The National Conference – Congress cartel still officially 
managed to get the majority of the votes, but they ruled without legitimacy.362  
 
The dissatisfaction led to a popular uprising in 1989. Sumit Ganguly supposes that 
another reason for the revolt could also be the expanded political awareness and 
participation in Kashmir, because India had invested in literacy, higher education and 
the mass media in Kashmir. A strong and unsatisfied middle class had arisen in 
Kashmir. Kashmiris were still in the opinion that the Indian government was not ready 
to expand the same rights to the Muslims of Kashmir that it guaranteed to other Indians 
in the country. The disappointment led to ethnic-religious mobilisation.363 Rahman calls 
this a ‘youthquake’ as most of the mobilised were young Kashmiris, who felt 
discriminated against, oppressed, and wronged by the history of India. They were 
inspired by a religious and cultural power that emanated from the Iranian revolution and 
the Soviet expulsion from Afghanistan.364 
Freedom Fighters 
Since the political conditions have continued to deteriorate with the erosion of Article 
370 and with Governor’s rule, a number of militant organisations have emerged to 
attempt to liberate Kashmir from India. Prominent among these is the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), formed in 1966. Other groups that emerged after the 
1977 elections include the Muslim united Front (MUF) and the People’s League.365 The 
leading faction within MUF was the Jamaat-e-Islami, which can be described as a non-
secular, Islamist, or ethnic party. It never accepted the accession of 1947 and openly 
expressed sympathies for the Pakistani General Zia-ul-Haq’s drive for Islamisation in 
Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami has been accused of being one of those responsible for the 
growing communalist tension in Kashmir.366 The number of militant groups continued 
to increase; according to security forces, by November 1990 there were 158 of them, 
and some other reports put this number at 40. India identifies these groups as ‘anti-
national’, ‘pro-Pakistan’, or ‘fundamentalist’. In 1990, Jagmohan banned Hizb-ul-
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Mujahideen (HUM), the JKLF, Jamaat-i-Islami, the Islami Students League, the 
People’s League, Mahaz-i-Azadi, and Jamaat-i-Tulba. These organisations can be 
divided into two groups: one group wants Islamisation and union with Pakistan, and the 
other group wants an independent Kashmir. The pro-Pakistani groups are the Jamaat-i-
Islami and its youth-wing Jamaat-i-Tulba, Hizb-ul-Islami, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the 
Muslim Students Federation, the Allah Tigers, the Zia Tiger Force, the Islami Students 
League, the Al-Jehad, the Tehrik-e-Amal, and the People’s League. Among those 
seeking an independent Kashmir are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and 
Kashmir’s Peoples Conference. Only the National Conference and its president Farooq 
Abdullah wanted restoration of the Article 370.367 
 
The JKLF came into existence during in 1965 and has been responsible for kidnappings 
and other smaller terrorist campaigns. Later on, the members of the JKLF turned into 
covert resistance against Indian rule in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and they were 
responsible to nobody but their own leadership and controlled by no government.368 The 
JKLF supports an ideology of Kashmir nationalism, which is opposed to Islamic 
fundamentalism. A commander of the JKLF has said that “whether we are Muslims, 
Christians, or Hindus, we are Kashmiris first, and we believe in secularism”. However, 
the JKLF has gradually moved toward an Islamic ideology. There are supporters of 
Islamic rule based on Quran and Sunnah within the organisation in Kashmir, but 
officially the JKLF is still for a reunified and independent Kashmir.369 The leader of  the 
JKLF, Yasin Malik, recalls “the rich tradition of humanity, brotherhood and communal 
harmony in Kashmir and invoked Gandhian values”.370 One of the most active 
organisations nowadays struggling for Kashmir’s self-determination is the Mujahideen 
Lashkar-e-Islam. It has formulated the mission followingly: “we strive hard and 
continue our struggle against India, to liberate Kashmir from the clutches of oppressors 
and to get the people of Kashmir the right for self-determination.”371 
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The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen has a membership of 11,000 young men. This group gained 
prominence in 1990 by kidnapping and killing Mir Mustafa, a former member of the 
legislative assembly. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is committed to Islam and Jihad. The 
group is responsible for forcing the closure of bars, beauty parlours and cinemas, which 
represent Western values. The members of this organisation assured the Hindu 
population that their struggle is only against the Indian occupation and that no harm will 
be done to Kashmiri Hindus, their property, or their places of worship. This is only 
partly true today. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen has divided into two parts. The militant part 
is closely connected to Pakistan, whereas the other one has been willing to negotiate 
with India about the situation in Kashmir.372 The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is well armed and 
has been involved in attacks on army installations and convoys in rural areas. It is 
alleged that the Hizb-ul-Mujahideens have close links to the Afghan Mujahideens.373 
Since 1990s, direct support has been given to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen by Pakistan.374  
 
The Hurriyat (freedom) Conference was formed in March 1990 to become an umbrella 
organisation for most of the separatist, or secessionist, organisations in Jammu and 
Kashmir. This 11-party alliance375 contends that because the accession to India was 
temporary, Kashmir poses an international problem that should be solved in keeping 
with the United Nations resolutions. The alliance believes that the Kashmiri people have 
a right to self-determination. The orientation of the Hurriyat Conference is Islamic, with 
a focus on freedom and Islam. Members are normally young academics and from legal 
and professional groups.376 Today the Hurriyat Conference is the mouthpiece on 
Kashmiri issues for the international press.  
The Origins of the Unrest 
Democracy was established in Jammu and Kashmir in 1977. In the 1970s and the early 
1980s, the National Conference was a fairly stable organisation and policies were still 
pursued on a secular basis. An underlying weakness in the system was that the most 
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important parties, such as the National Conference and the Congress Party, were 
organised dynastically or nepotistically. The democracy in Jammu and Kashmir started 
to decline drastically in 1983 and 1984. The behaviour of the political elite led to 
deinstitutionalisation, which in turn led to populism and communalism and concluded in 
political violence. Both the Congress (I) and the National Conference were then 
struggling for support and trying to hold their poorly organised parties together. 
Regional and religious arguments began to be used in the effort to attract political 
support, even if the overall character of the political messages from the parties could 
still be described as mostly secular. Before the election of 1987, there was still 
motivation for a democratic solution, but after the betrayal of the rules of democratic 
fair play and the events during the 1987 election, many politically aroused but frustrated 
young Kashmiris turned to armed struggle. Finally, in 1989, the political opposition 
gave up its belief in the usefulness of competing within what was left of the democratic 
framework.377  
 
The social differences between Hindus and Muslims might have fuelled the conflict at 
least to some extent. The Pandits and the Dogras belong to the traditional elite in 
Jammu and Kashmir and, like Brahmins all over in India, the Pandits are 
overrepresented in banks, private companies, and salaried jobs in the public sector. An 
Indian intellectual and an appreciated columnist Prem Shankar Jha argues that this 
imbalance is one of  the most important underlying causes of the conflict.378 Muslims 
have, in many ways, received a rather raw deal in secular India. Their share of urban 
ghettoisation and rural pauperisation is proportionately greater than that of Hindus. 
Muslims also remain deplorably under-represented in the Indian Administrative 
Services and the Indian Police Service.379 On the other hand,  the economic decline 
seems more likely be a consequence of the violence than a cause of it. The economic 
situation improved in Jammu and Kashmir as the income level rose steadily from 1950 
to 1986, although it was about 10% below India’s average per capita income. In 1986, 
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the economy began to falter because of climatic conditions and the increased breakdown 
of law and order.380 
 
The external cause for the uprisings in Jammu and Kashmir is the battle between India 
and Pakistan because of their different kind of visions of nationalism and state-building. 
This has then led to a dispute over regional order. For India, Kashmir is symbolic of 
secular nationalism and state-building and of the possibility of a Muslim-majority area 
choosing to live and prosper within a Hindu-majority country. For Pakistan, Kashmir is 
symbolic of the impossibility of secular nationalism in the region and thus of the need 
for a Muslim homeland in the North-western corner of the subcontinent.381 The 
countries are not even close to finding an agreement on the difficult situation in Jammu 
and Kashmir. According to some sources the uprising there is part of a scheme planned 
by the Pakistani government to capture Jammu and Kashmir. This has been referred to 
as Operation Topac, and it has been alleged that it was created by General Zia ul-
Haq.382 The government of Pakistan has supported some of the uprisings in Jammu and 
Kashmir, by allowing separatists access to the arms market and allowing them to 
establish bases inside Pakistan, but a more active role of Pakistan is hard to prove.383 
The situation in Jammu and Kashmir has continued through the 1990s as a low-scale 
war. Both India and Pakistan have their troops there and clashes between the groups 
happen every day.  
 
Assessment: The Contest of Indian Secularism  
 
The contest of Indian secularism developed fast during the 1980s, and some of the 
economic problems of 1970s gave an impetus for it. In the 1970s, India was faced with 
starvation, a lack of currency, an increase in prices and growing unemployment. The 
highly praised green revolution did not turn out to be such a big success as was 
expected and India needed to import a lot of grain from abroad.384 The Congress party 
was not able to react to this and solve the problems which caused a lot of disorder and 
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confusion in the country. The nationalist parties started to offer an alternative for the 
Congress Party.385 The Congress Party responded to the challenge by declaring an 
Emergency in 1975. Other reasons are connected to the politics of the Congress Party, 
which have over the years manifested an increasing disarray, and have been riddled by 
both corruption386 and factionalism. This included the decay of institutions: the 
downhill of the Congress party, the politicisation of the justice institution and the need 
to rely on military power in maintaining the public order. Its long periods in power, and 
internal divisiveness, and its loss of collective purpose, have created the space for 
challengers, who could mobilise many in the urban-based middle and lower classes. The 
main mobiliser has been the BJP party, in terms of making a collective Hindu identity 
through populist cultural rhetoric. The second mobilisation has taken place through  the 
insurgency mounted by radical Sikhs and the Khalistan secessionist movement. In 
addition to the disastrous and worsening war in Kashmir, which led to the flight of 
many Kashmiri Hindus and seriously put the continuing unity of India in jeopardy, there 
has been much anxiety, especially among India’s burgeoning middle classes, about the 
threat of the country’s political fragmentation and attendant economic losses.387  
 
Certain structural changes in the organisation of national political authority, made 
during Indira Gandhi’s era, were also partly responsible for the break-up of 
nationalisms. Precisely because of the existence of a weak national identity, and the 
country’s potential for disintegration, the founders of the modern political system in 
India recognised the need for the creation of a federal polity. It was seen as an outlet for 
the utilisation and satisfaction of the political ambitions of the regional and local elites. 
This has also helped in the regionalisation of political conflicts.388 
The Surrender of Secularism  
Although the Indian state does not openly side with any religion, in practice it has not 
always functioned in a secular manner. It has failed to deal with the challenges of 
Punjab and Kashmir because it adopted a strategy of compromising with communalism 
by surrendering its secular ideology. The state apparatus per se failed to contain the 
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religious terrorists in Punjab.389 The method adopted to solve the Babri Masjid dispute 
is another example of the Indian state surrendering its secular role. There was an 
attempt to solve the dispute through mutual negotiations with the representatives of the 
Hindu and Muslim communities. Therefore, the state abdicated its role of intervening 
and settling disputes on the principles of secular governance. These incidents clearly 
reveal the limits of state intervention, because there were no attempts to solve the crisis 
through an ideological offensive by the secular state of India. The contests that have 
taken place in India have demonstrated that the ideological legitimisation process of the 
Indian state is weak and fractured, and society and the state in India are dealing with 
multiple and competing ideologies.390 The vacillatory stance of Indian state has been 
responsible to great extent for the escalation of communalism in independent India.391  
 
Sumantra Bose argues that the insurrection currently raging in Kashmir is a direct result 
of a consistent policy of oppressing the Kashmiri people, and the denial and subversion 
of their basic democratic and human rights by the Indian state; starting with Nehru, and 
continued by Indira’s and Rajiv’s regimes. According to him, it is thoroughly 
misleading to depict the Kashmir conflict as a revolt of a Muslim-majority province 
against predominantly Hindu India. The battle is more accurately characterised as one 
between the brutally coercive power of a big state and the resistance of a people who 
happen to be mostly Muslim.392  
 
The Congress government has falsely interpreted the principle ‘equal respect for all 
religions’ to require intervention in religious affairs and support for religious activities 
are required in order for all Indians to have an equal opportunity to practise their 
religions. Since independence, state policies have been marked by active regulation and 
institutionalisation of the practices of religious communities, as the government has 
protected and maintained religious institutions, funded television shows advocating 
particular religious views, subsidised religious educational institutions, granted tax 
breaks for mosques and temples, and permitted aspects of Islamic law pertaining to 
marriage, divorce and inheritance to apply only to Muslim communities,393 like the 
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Shah Bano case in 1987, when the civil courts awarded alimony to a divorced Muslim 
woman contrary to the provisions of the shariat. When agitation against the Shah Bano 
case decision among orthodox and conservative Muslims intensified and appeared to 
gain mass support, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi capitulated to conservative Muslim 
opinion to the extent that he passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill. This literally adopted the provisions of shariat into secular law.394 The 
decision of Rajiv Gandhi accelerated the clashes between Hindus and Muslims. It also 
provided a ready-made propaganda weapon to the growing Hindutva movement’s claim 
that the Indian state was pseudo-secular and pro-Muslim, and that it appeased minorities 
at the expense of the interests of the majority.395  
Centralisation and Personalisation of Politics 
The communalist problems in India became more salient in the late 1970s, when Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, without undertaking any formal amendment to the Constitution, 
centralised more political power to her own hands. In addition to her absolute control 
over the national government, she also created a pyramid-like structure for the Congress 
party, which was reduced to merely an instrument of her personal power. The people 
that she appointed to political posts were also known to be loyal to her. This 
understandingly led to growing corruption. In the 1980s Rajiv Gandhi continued on the 
same lines as his mother.  
 
In the moral vacuum of Indian politics Indira Gandhi “created” the Punjab problem in 
order to secure and consolidate a perpetual Congress majority in national elections. At 
the end it paid off in the massive victory of the Congress in 1984, due to the wave of 
sympathy and national rage in the wake of the assassination of Indira Gandhi.396 Her 
reluctance to solve the Akali agitation was also part of a calculated strategy to divide the 
Akalis into moderates and extremists, while cultivating sympathy among a 
predominantly Hindu electorate.397 In the media, Indira Gandhi normally described the 
opposition as religious fanatics who advocate secession and separatism and are 
motivated by communalism and regionalism. She also referred to the actions and 
statements of the extremists more often than to those of the moderates. Punjabis in 
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return were aware of this misrepresentation of their concerns and its acceptance, and it 
only increased their frustration and anger. It also evidently increased their willingness to 
tolerate, for example, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.398 After the defeat in the elections in 
1977, Indira Gandhi shifted the Congress Party from a so-called protector of religious 
minorities and secular values to a champion of Hindu interests. She passionately 
advocated Hindu hegemony in the Hindi heartland, made numerous pilgrimages to 
Hindu religious sites throughout the country, and even hired an internationally-
recognised guru to be her spiritual guide. Rajiv Gandhi followed his mother’s 
politics.399  
 
The process of the centralisation and personalisation of political authority resulted in an 
increased inability of the system to accommodate regional demands. Every regional 
movement was perceived as a threat to the Prime Minister’s supremacy, and an 
autonomous political opposition was regarded as a hindrance to national integration. 
The most salient incident was Operation Bluestar. The political activity of the 
nationalist movements grew during the Emergency (1975-77), when Indira Gandhi 
cancelled all civil rights and forbade the activity of political parties. Consequently, 
people lost their faith in the functioning of the Indian political system. In Kashmir, Mrs 
Gandhi reacted to the nationalist demands by trying to suppress the minorities and 
cancelling most of the special rights given earlier, such as the Article 370 in the Indian 
Constitution that guarantees autonomy to Kashmir and Jammu. The conflict in Jammu 
and Kashmir seems to have deepened because of the difficulty of Kashmiri political 
institutions and leaders to handle the pressure from an interventionist central 
government. Indira Gandhi was able to dismiss Farooq Abdullah without trouble and 
persuade the National Conference into an alliance with the Congress (I). The shaken 
balance between local autonomy and central control had to do with the fundamental 
questions of who shall govern, in whose interests, and to what ends. 
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The New Nationalism  
The Punjabi crisis, Hindu nationalism and the Kashmir dispute have all raised serious 
questions about the future of India’s democracy and the ability of the country to 
accommodate the aspirations of religious and linguistic minorities under the Indian 
Union. There was a moral, political and ideological vacuum in Indian politics, which 
the nationalisms as political forms surged to fill up. People were disappointed with the 
politics of the Congress party and they were open to new policies and change.400 One 
suggested solution could be to stop seeing subnational identities as threats to the central 
government. The problems in Punjab and Kashmir show the need for a new nationalism 
instead of the ‘old’ Indian nationalism. This new nationalism should be comfortable 
with multiple loyalties, which focuses loyalty to the centre because the centre helps 
expand the cultural and political space available to people of diverse faiths, languages, 
and ethnicities.401  
 
Hindutva has tried to create a new nationalism for India. It is quite similar, in its 
emphasis and content, to the monolithic, unitary conception of Indian nationalism that 
has tried to serve as the official ideology of the post-colonial Indian state, but it reduces 
Indian nationalism to a brute Hindu majoritarianism. This helps explain why Hindu 
nationalism as a political creed has assumed salience and potency in the state in India. 
Hindu nationalism differs from its post-colonial Congress counterpart in its explicitly 
communalist focus. The similarities, on the other hand, are compelling. Hindu 
nationalists do not at all reject the Congress model of post-colonial nation-building. 
They accuse it of impotence and ineffectiveness because it has not gone far enough. The 
secular state and communalist politics, far from being binary opposites, have in reality 
been interlinked and implicated in one another: they are the two sides of the coin of a 
monolithic and state-centralist conceptualisation of Indian nationalism. Their relation is 
therefore dialectical, not adversarial. In 1969, Jana Sangh, proclaiming Indianisation its 
ultimate goal, defined it as the subordination of all narrow loyalties like religion, caste, 
region, language or dogma to the overriding loyalty to the nation. And the constitutive 
of this nation was the Hinduness of a man. That makes him a national of India.402 
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It can be argued that the political crisis between different nationalisms in India and the 
Indian state is a by-product of the defects in India’s secular, democratic political system. 
National political elites view ethno-religious identifications as harmful cleavages 
undermining political integration, development and modernisation. The processes of 
national integration and modernisation assume the necessity to forge new loyalties to 
the centralising state through the formulation of a ‘national’ culture or identity and the 
erosion of ‘parochial’ ethnic identities. But a countertendency reinforcing ethnic 
identity exists in India, which takes the form of group representation in the democratic 
political process. The process of nation-building emphasises the forces that bring about 
assimilation into one system, but the dynamics of democratic competition often amplify 
the need for collective expression by ethnic groups. This suggests a ‘democratic 
paradox’. Within Punjab, however, the countertendency of reinforcing ethnic identity 
was exacerbated by the well-entrenched, institutionalised Sikh ethno-religious 
organisations that promoted their own Sikh nation-building tendencies.403 
Unity Under Threat 
The crises raise serious questions about whether democracy can continue to function in 
the face of the polarisation of politics along sectarian or linguistic lines, and whether the 
Indian Union can continue to contain forces of disintegration. The danger for 
democracy lies also in the growth of paramilitary organisations, as well as in the 
armament of the army. This continuing deployment of various paramilitary units as well 
as the army is fatal for Indian democracy, and it has only exacerbated the situation in 
Jammu and Kashmir and in Punjab.404  
 
The situation in Kashmir and Punjab will continue to affect India’s international 
relations, as the volatile situation in the Kashmir Valley and Pakistan’s support for the 
insurgents raises the possibility of unintentional or even intentional war.405 The bad 
situation in Punjab is reflected in those countries to which Sikhs have immigrated from 
India, such as Britain and Canada. After Operation Bluestar many riots took place in 
these countries as well.406 The same happened also after the demolition of the mosque in 
1992. India has gone through a reorientation in its armed forces to be able to respond to  
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external danger. During the 1980s, a very large paramilitary establishment was built to 
deal with religious and ethnic tensions in these highly politicised affairs. In 1989, 
medium range missiles were tested, which could be armed with nuclear warheads,407  
and in 1998, India performed nuclear tests in the Rajasthani desert. Prime Minister Atal 
Behari Vajpayee proudly announced that India now has a “big bomb”.408 Vajpayee had 
dreamed of the weapon from the 1970s on.409  
 
The contest by the nationalisms threatens the unity and federalism of India. Secularism 
was taken as the blueprint in India, particularly to guarantee unity. The Congress Party 
would be the right channel for strengthening secularism, if it only had the sincere will to 
do it. Recently, the desire for power and corruption have been keeping it away from its 
task and Hindu nationalism has been able to take the lead in the politics. Punjab and 
Kashmir, then, are both essential parts of India. Punjab is not that big of a threat, as it 
does not have another country fighting on its side, but the situation in Kashmir is more 
serious because of the proximity of Pakistan. According to the mantra of India, Kashmir 
is holding India together; if Kashmir were able to secede from the Indian Union, there is 
the danger that other federal states might try the same. The secession of Kashmir or 
Punjab would then mean the end of Indian secularism, federalism and democracy. 
Hindu Rashtra, if comes true, would be a threat to the existence of other religions in 
India. The persecution of other religions has already become salient in Indian society.  
 
THE CRISIS OF INDIAN SECULARISM 
 
In this chapter, I first look at the reasons for the unsuitability of modernity for India and 
for why secularism does not function in India as it is supposed to do.  Then I move to 
the crisis of nationalism and the nation-state by explaining why Indian nationalism did 
not succeed in uniting the Indian nation and why we can say that the Indian state is in a 
state of crisis. After this I examine the reasons for the crisis of secularism inside the 
Indian political culture. For this purpose I use the theories of Antonio Gramsci and Juan 
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Linz. After presenting the principles of the organic crisis of the Indian state, I close by 
having a look at the political history of independent India to show how the crisis of 
secularism has developed in the course of history.  
The Crisis in Nation-Building 
The Unsuitability of Modernity 
Indian secularism is a creation of modernity and the idea of a modern nation-state, and it 
was supposed to guarantee the unity of India and the welfare of the citizens. Many of 
the researchers who specialise in Indian history and politics argue that secularism does 
not suit India. They find the reasons for the rise of communal feeling in modernity.410 
India is a traditional society, and modernity, which was brought to India by the colonial 
power, has always remained an unfamiliar element to Indians and is seen as something 
threatening, as the ‘Other’.  
 
Modernity has a role in the increase of communalist violence. Ashis Nandy claims that 
today, as India gets modernised, traditional tolerance is diminishing and religious 
violence increasing. In earlier centuries interreligious riots were rare and localised. Over 
ninety per cent of the riots begin in urban India, within and around industrial areas.411 
According to T. N. Madan’s view, modernity also replaces religion with modern, 
scientific principles. This triggers off an irreconcilable conflict between scientific 
secularism and religion. Religion, which has been marginalised in India, becomes a 
source of resistance to this alien world-view and sometimes curdles into bigotry and 
violence. Therefore, the demand for the removal of religion from public life within the 
secular framework, which is based on the mainstream Enlightenment view of religion, 
is irrational.412 Much of the fanaticism and violence associated with religion today 
comes from the sense of defeat of the believers, from their feeling of impotency, and 
from their free-floating anger and self-hatred while facing a world which is increasingly 
secular and desacralised.413 The rise of communalism confirms Rajeev Bhargava’s 
assumption that secularism in the context of India is insensitive to religious people. By 
forcing people to think of their religion as a matter of private preference, it has 
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uncoupled the link between religion and community, and deprives people of their sense 
of identity.414 It has become more and more obvious that modernity is no longer the 
ideology of a small minority; it is now the organising principle of the dominant culture 
in politics. The fact that religion, or as Ashis Nandy classifies it, religion-as-faith415, 
dominates the normal life of Indians, is being pushed to the side in politics.  
 
Madan argues that secularism will not find a suitable form in which it could function in 
India. In the prevailing circumstances, secularism as a generally shared credo of life is 
impossible in South Asia, because a great majority of the people of South Asia are in 
their own eyes active adherents of some religious faith. It is also impracticable as a basis 
for state action, because the standpoint of religious neutrality is difficult to maintain 
since religious minorities do not share the majority’s view of what this entails for the 
state. According to Madan, secularism would also be impotent as a blueprint for the 
foreseeable future, because it is incapable of countering religious fundamentalism and 
fanaticism.416 Amartya Sen disagrees on this with Madan. Sen writes that the Indian 
state needs to be secular in the political sense, but does not have to withdraw from 
dealing with religions and religious communities altogether. For example, it is no 
violation of secularism for a state to protect everyone’s right to worship as he or she 
chooses, even though in doing this the state has to work with– and for– religious 
communities.417  
The Crisis of the Nation-State  
The nation-building process did  not work out as well as had been planned in India. The 
nation was imagined, but the people did not support this imagined nation. Indian 
nationalism based on a secular citizenship rather than on any mystical cultural or ethnic 
essence. Interestingly, there was no way, in the political arrangement, for any person to 
be only Indian and nothing else; one could not be an Indian without being something 
else at the same time. Being a Punjabi, Hindu or Muslim, was not contradictory to being 
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an Indian. Indianness was a complex and multilayered identity which encompassed 
other such identities without cancelling them out.418 However, this idea of homo indicus 
has never fully been adapted by the people. The Indian minorities that consider 
themselves the real nations of India started to rebel against the Indian nation after it had 
forbidden their demands for autonomy or sovereignty.419 They wanted Indian states to 
be reorganised on a linguistic basis. The Congress Party argued that the linguistic 
principle would mean sowing the seeds of destruction of the political unity of India. 
India could only be effectively ruled by concentrating the power in the capital and 
dividing the basis for democratic solidarity between the provinces. The Indian state 
always took the position that there was only one nation – India – and its territorial 
sovereignty was unitary and inviolate.420  
 
A sense of Indianness is by no means absent among the citizenry, but the project of 
integrating the nation seems to have been a very partial success. This is manifested most 
graphically in the growth of powerful and popular secessionist insurgencies during the 
eighties and nineties in Kashmir, Assam and Punjab.421 These problems have turned the 
attention to the creation of a distinct nationalism, which usually combines religion, 
language and ethnicity. The creation of homo indicus has partly failed because religions 
in India are totalising; they have strong importance in everyday life, old religious 
traditions are highly valued and people will not give up on those ones422. Amartya Sen, 
unlike Nandy and Madan, does not see Indian identity as a stable basis for the national 
development of India. He suggests that the identity of being a Hindu, a Muslim, or a 
Sikh should politically come before being Indian. Sen asserts that, given the 
preponderance of Hindus in the country, other Indian national identities cannot form a 
part of a largely homogeneous identity as a necessary basis for nationhood. Only a 
shared cultural outlook, which in India can only be a largely Hindu view, can produce 
such a cohesion.423  
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The modern nation-state tries to appeal to believers to keep the public sphere free of 
religion, but it has no means of ensuring that the ideologies of secularism, development 
and nationalism themselves do not begin to act as faiths intolerant of others. On the 
contrary, with the help of modern communications and the secular coercive power at its 
command, the state frequently uses its ideology to silence its non-conforming 
citizens.424 Ashis Nandy concludes that the proposition that the secular ideology of the 
state would be a better guide to political action and to a less violent and richer political 
life is unsuitable for India. It has become increasingly clear that, as far as public 
morality goes, the Indian state has very little moral authority left.425  
 
The crisis of the Indian nation-state has several dimensions economically. The five-year 
plans in their early stages got remarkable results by rationalising resource utilisation and 
giving some direction to the economy. But once this was reached, traditional forms of 
planning failed to produce growth and made industries wasteful. Bureaucratic shielding 
of their performance and government protection made them immune to criticism and 
they became expensive white elephants. The state sector also came to represent an 
economic sphere whose function slipped unnoticed from a predominantly economic to a 
political one: from distribution of welfare by producing low cost inputs for industries, to 
producers of unaccountable funds used by politicians and bureaucrats. The corruption 
inside the political machinery increased.426  
 
A second success of the Nehruvian development design also started turning sour. 
Industrialisation after independence helped strengthen the national economy, but at the 
cost of intensifying regional inequalities. With the opportunity provided by democratic 
institutions, resentment against regional unevenness tended to find quick outlets in 
regionalist movements. Indira Gandhi successfully pursued policies of isolation in 
Assam and Punjab, outmanoeuvring regional opposition through a formal democratic 
process. However, sometimes the central government was successful in transforming 
guerrilla leaders into instant Chief Ministers; such transactions were done in an attempt 
to head off widespread social resentment, but they often led to the quick isolation of the 
leaders because of the disapproval of their militant followers. In any case, this pattern 
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did nothing to produce long term political stability. Punjab offers the best example of a 
situation where the people of the state became the battlefield between two combatants 
speaking in the name of contrary nationalisms: Indian armed forces preserving the 
Indian nation-state and armed militants trying to create a new Punjabi state of 
Khalistan.427 
 
The central contradiction in the history of the Indian nation-state seems to be between 
the logic of economic development and the logic of political identities. Economic 
change through the centralising state and the homogenising market works towards large 
entities, like commodities and the labour market. The associated institutions of the 
modern society, such as the armed forces, the large and powerful bureaucracy, a 
massive managerial middle class the size of the population of the big European nations, 
all understand the advantages of scale; they enjoy the surpluses that only India’s scale 
makes possible. Therefore, this is one of the reasons for the ruling-elite to speak the 
language of national integration and unity. Unity, too, often has become to mean the 
homogenisation of the political communities. This does violence to the political 
imagination of the Indian nation-state, which emphasised diversity as a great asset and 
enjoyed the principles of tolerance and mixture as the special gift of the Indian 
civilisation.428 
The Organic Crisis of the Indian State 
 
The contest of Indian secularism has led secularism to an organic crisis in the post-
colonial Indian state. It has been in the making for several decades, and inevitably has 
massive influence throughout civil society as well. I will first present the theoretical 
background of the organic crisis, following the theories of Juan Linz and Antonio 
Gramsci. They come from very different kinds of intellectual surroundings; Linz 
represents today’s political research whereas Gramsci was a Marxist scholar from the 
beginning of the 20th century. However, they both speak in the same way about the 
organic crisis of a state. Neither of them has used the theory in an Indian context. 
Gramsci has studied Italy and Linz Spain, but both of the theories apply to the situation 
in India. This chapter aims to show that the contemporary Indian crisis is a 
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multidimensional one, in which the earlier discussed communalist conflict is but one 
aspect. The other aspect comprises the Congress regimes’ policies that have facilitated 
the meteoric rise of Hindu, Sikh and Kashmiri nationalisms. As Juan Linz puts it, “the 
independent contributions made to regime crisis by political incumbents is an aspect all 
too often to be overlooked” because of a one-sided focus on the characteristics and 
activities of apparently radical opposition movements.429 The focus of Linz’s430 study is 
on the incumbents and their actions, and their way of defining problems and the 
capacity to solve them.431  
 
An organic crisis is systematic and relatively permanent. It has deep structural roots, 
and cannot be resolved through mere changes in the personnel of the government. An 
organic crisis tends to generate chronic social and political instability, and occasionally, 
major political realignments. The organic crisis of the Indian state has two major 
dimensions: one at the level of the democratic regime, and the other in the sphere of the 
party system. At the level of the regime prevails a situation that Juan Linz characterises 
as a crisis of “legitimacy”. This crisis in turn has two dimensions which concern a 
severely damaged and deficient regime, “efficacy” and the regime “effectiveness”. 
Efficacy refers to the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing 
any political system. Effectiveness, then, refers to the capacity to actually implement the 
policies that have been formulated, with the desired results.432 The crisis of regime 
legitimacy is defined by failures in the interrelated categories of efficacy and 
effectiveness. Legitimacy crises have two salient aspects. First, they are not unfortunate 
accidents or aberrations but the result of structural strains. Second, regime breakdowns 
are only the ceulmination of a long and complex process.433 In India, there is a crisis of 
legitimacy for the secularism as for the Congress party. Secular politics in India have 
not been able to find peaceful ways to contain communalist violence. Instead they have 
intervened the state government formations and relied on the armed forces.  
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In the sphere of competitive party-politics, there is a “crisis of hegemony” for the 
Congress Party. This has generated a situation of unprecedented instability, 
unpredictability and flux in the multi-party system.434 The concept ‘hegemony’ 
constitutes Gramsci’s major theoretical innovation in his Prison Notebooks. It has not 
been formulated clearly but instead has been used in variable meanings and 
connections. Generally, hegemony has come to be understood as a mode of social 
control by which one group exerts its dominance over others by means of ideology.435 
In Antonio Gramsci’s writings, an organic crisis refers to the historical failure of the 
Italian bourgeoisie to generate the liberal society envisaged during the period of national 
unification, the Risorgimento.436 “In any country the process is different, although the 
content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, which 
occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for 
which it has requested, or forcibly imposed, the consent of the broad masses (especially 
of peasants and petite-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of 
political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which in their 
disorganic whole constitute revolution. A ‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of, and this is 
precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the state”.437 Differently, a crisis of 
hegemony occurs when a force that has formerly exerted political, economic and 
ideological leadership over society is challenged from below and is no longer able to 
sustain a cohesive bloc of social alliances. It is this overall crisis that has provided the 
context and opportunity for the communalist movements to make a serious challenge 
for capturing the state power. The crisis has made salient old and new conflicts, 
contradictions and cleavages in India’s vast and increasingly differentiated social 
structure, and has fostered profound dissatisfaction, disillusionment and anxiety among 
sections of the population.438   
 
Another dimension of the organic crisis, according to Linz, is the failure of the regimes, 
particularly democracies, in building legitimacy to define boundaries of the state and the 
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nation. In this case, full democracy must allow the expression of the nationalism of the 
periphery, and it permits not only autonomist or federalist demands, but secessionist 
demands.439 Tolerance of secessionist and separatist movements has not succeeded in 
India. These secessionist movements can be described with Linz’s term disloyal 
opposition. Disloyal oppositions are minorities but also certain parties, movements and 
organisations which reject political systems based on the authority of the state or a 
central authority with coercive powers, or for example secessionist and irredentist 
nationalist movements can be defined as disloyal oppositions.440 Good examples of 
Linzian disloyal oppositions in the Indian context are Kashmiri and Sikh secessionists, 
who reject the present Indian state as a legitimate institutional framework. The BJP is 
clearly not a disloyal opposition in this sense. It is, to the contrary, an extremely system-
oriented party which is in the favour of the centralisation and the coercive role of the 
state. However, the BJP does meet Linz’s definitive criterion for semiloyalty,441 which 
is a willingness to encourage, tolerate, cover up, excuse, or justify the actions of other 
participants that go beyond the limits of peaceful, legitimate patterns of politics in a 
democracy. Parties become suspect when, on the basis of ideological affinity, agreement 
on some ultimate goal (Hindu Rashtra), or particular policies, they make a distinction 
between means and ends. Ultimately, semiloyalty can be identified by a system-oriented 
party’s greater affinity for extremists on its side of the political spectrum than for 
system parties closer to the opposite side.442 In a normal situation a democratic 
government should enjoy legitimacy even among those who constitute its opposition. 
This is what is meant by the expression loyal opposition.443 
 
Gramsci defined a ‘war of movement’ as a series of frontal assaults on the ruling 
authority, and a ‘war of position’ as a protracted organisational and mobilisational effort 
in civil society, whose objective is the formation of a collective will among the people, 
a prerequisite for the taking of state power. The Hindu nationalist campaign is mostly a 
war of position,  whereas the conflicts between Sikhs/Kashmiris and the Congress party 
have taken the form of a war of movement. A ‘passive revolution’ is a historical 
situation in which a new political formation comes to power without fundamentally 
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reordering social relations, but rather by adapting to and gradually modifying the status 
quo.444 It also refers to a persistent series of reforms to the political system without the 
integration of the masses into the public sphere. The majority of the populace has 
continually remained outside of any effective control over political institutions – 
essentially passive – despite being subject to their rule.445 According to Bose, the goal 
of the Hindutva movement is a “passive revolution” in crisis-ridden India.446 
 
The systematic exclusion of or discrimination against the opposition in many realms of 
public life, such as the bureaucracy, the armed forces, or the administration of 
interventionist economic policies, might push those ready to form a loyal opposition 
into semi- and disloyal positions.447 Such is the case in Kashmir and partly in Punjab. 
The Muslims of Kashmir have been denied representation in the better occupations of 
the state, and in Punjab the central government has intervened dramatically in the 
economic planning. The most serious crises are those in which the maintenance of the 
public order becomes impossible within a democratic framework: when the regime 
needs to be reassured of the loyalty of the forces of repression, when the use of such 
forces against one or another group becomes impossible without endangering the 
regime-sustaining coalitions, and when the disloyal opposition is perceived as capable 
of mobilising large parts of the population, or strategically located sectors of it, unless 
the problem is solved.448 
 
Uneven development is closely related to persistent, indeed deepening forms of social 
inequalities and attendant conflicts in India. Caste is still a reality in the social and 
political life, most glaringly among Hindi-speaking Hindus in Northern India. Indeed, 
caste has become firmly established as the organising principle of contemporary Indian 
politics, and this fact has much to do with the present appeal of the Hindutva ideology 
to certain caste-based social groups. These structural underpinnings, combined with 
various conjunctural developments, had resulted in an organic crisis of state power in 
the 1970s and 1980s. However, in order to show how this crisis unfolded, it is necessary 
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to look deeper into and retrace the major trends in India’s institutional politics and 
political economy since 1947.449 
The Decline of Indian Secularism 
The Nehru Tenure 
The relative stability of the Nehru years (1947-1964) has often been contrasted with the 
personalised and plebiscitary politics associated with Indira Gandhi. But there are 
problems with this dichotomy, especially given the limited and fragile structural basis of 
the Nehruvian consensus. During the Nehru era the state was meant to be a viable 
machinery of power exercised by the ruling class. It was an elaborate system of 
balances, structured hierarchically as well as over geographical regions, providing a 
reasonable degree of autonomy at each level.450 This balancing between different 
sectional interests within the ruling class alliance was sustained by the Congress party 
which was built on alliances with influential men in villages, towns, and districts 
throughout India, a system which was based on the ability of the ruling party to provide 
patronage in return for votes.451 Since the 1960s, however, politicians gradually started 
to become more provincial, while federalism became more complex, requiring 
bargaining and accommodation between governments run by different political 
parties.452 Beneath the rhetoric of modernisation, Nehru’s regime was reproducing 
traditional patterns of domination, and creating new ones. It was during Nehru’s reign 
that an elaborate system of patron-client networks developed, whereby agrarian 
dominants delivered the votes of the subaltern classes as well as their own to the 
Congress during the elections of the fifties and sixties. The fundamental and long-term 
failure in both efficacy and effectiveness fostered a crisis of regime legitimacy, as well 
as serious questions about the viability of Congress hegemony in competitive party-
politics. This was reflected first in a dramatic decline in support at regional and 
provincial levels for Congress at the first general elections in 1967 after Nehru’s death, 
                                                          
449
 Bose 1998, 113-4. 
450
 Chatterjee 1997, 102. 
451
 Ludden David, Introduction, Ayodhya: A Window on the World. In Making India Hindu: Religion, 
Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India ed. Ludden David, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1996, 17-8.  
452
 Thakur 1993, 648. 
 105
 
culminating in the split of 1969 into old guard and populist-progressive Indira Gandhi 
factions.453  
Indira Gandhi’s Authoritarianism  
Indira Gandhi’s Congress was never the same as Nehru’s Congress. The basic accent 
was now on the centralising of executive power. Thus, the representational function of 
the ruling party, which was earlier diffused and layered across different levels and 
regions, was now concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister, who, beyond all 
political interest groups, supposedly stood in a direct relationship with the nation. This 
centralising tendency and an increasing reliance on state violence to meet oppositional 
moves were a response to growing unrest, and to agitational movements by the 
oppressed classes. The difficulties with this system became clear during the Emergency 
period (1975-77). The Emergency showed the inherent difficulties of an undemocratic 
and centralised system in maintaining a balance between different sections and interests 
divided regionally and locally. There are sources saying that Mrs Gandhi’s return to 
power in 1980 did not alter this tendency.454 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared the 
Emergency because she had noticed that a small but religiously fundamental group was 
preparing with the press to overthrow the government. She found the Emergency a 
success, as everything worked well during that time and because she had saved the 
country from anarchy.455 Behind these words by Mrs Gandhi could have been the fact 
that she was being accused of using her privileges as Prime Minister, like the airplanes 
of the government, for her election campaign which could have prevented her to take 
part in the coming elections.456 
 
At the level of the political process, the imposition of the Emergency, followed by the 
defeat of the Congress party and the election of the Janata Party in 1977, brought 
immense changes to the party system and the strategies of mobilisation. The Congress 
(I) tried to gain votes from the political terrain which was normally occupied by right-
wing parties.457 A new election strategy were the vote banks, which Indira Gandhi built 
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along sectarian divides. There was a series of laws, decisions and policies that 
cumulatively seemed to demand adherence of the majority community to secularism, 
while conceding to the Muslim minority the right to live by other norms. This 
progressively eroded the very secularism on which the security of Muslims depended in 
a Hindu-majority country. Permitting Muslim men to have four wives, for instance, is 
grist to the Hindu chauvinist’s propaganda mill that India will eventually be overrun by 
Muslims.458 
     
The understanding of the retreat of secularism begins by looking at the nature and 
character of inter-communal relations in the 1980s. Communalist riots were not entirely 
absent in the Nehru era. But there has been a tremendous spurt in communalist violence 
since the late 1960s which has bloodied the Indian landscape. Communalist forces, kept 
under check by Nehru’s leadership, surged forward causing serious damage to India’s 
secularism. The last phase of the Indira Gandhi era witnessed a marked polarisation of 
Indian society on communal and sectarian lines. Nearly 4,000 people were killed in 
communalist violence, which is almost four times the corresponding figure from the 
1970s. The number of districts affected increased from 61 in 1960 to 250 in 1986-87. 
Another notable feature was that, while in the past these incidents occurred mainly in 
urban areas, more recently they have also spread to rural areas.459  
 
The closing years of the Indira Gandhi era were marked by the breakdown of the secular 
consensus. The leading ruling class party was worried that its close identification with 
minorities bore the risk of alienating many of their constituents, as Muslims had already 
begun to drift away from the Congress. The gradual decline of the Congress base made 
it possible for communalistically oriented groups to step into the political vacuum. The 
Congress responded with appropriate communalist themes, especially with themes of 
Hindu hegemony that appeal to the Hindi heartland. Such themes and symbols gained 
currency in Indira Gandhi’s speeches.460 The Congress Party had also earlier adapted 
the cow as the symbol of the Party, even though the use of religious symbols for 
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advertisement was forbidden.461 The cow is the symbol of the Mother and fertility for 
the Hindus and it is a good means of raising the feeling of togetherness among Hindus. 
During 1982, the Congress leaders recognised that a confrontational posture towards the 
National Conference and the Sikh extremists might gain them the support of many 
Hindus in Kashmir and Delhi. The logic behind the move to the right was somewhat 
similar to Indira Gandhi’s adoption of radical slogans after 1969. Then, it was a means 
of undermining the parties on the left, while now, the move to the right was an attempt 
to appropriate the symbols and appeals of the rightist parties, mainly the BJP, which 
posed a threat to the Congress in Northern India. This strategy was put to effective use 
in the 1984 elections. The Congress leaders adopted a narrow and intolerant rhetoric in 
which the opposition parties were routinely attacked as anti-national forces. This sort of 
strategy catalysed communal sentiments and provided the Congress an opportunity to 
become the main spokesman for majoritarian interests by concluding that in doing so 
the Congress was protecting India from the dangers of communalism and disunity.462 
Indira Gandhi was consequently able to arrest the Congress’ decline as India’s 
hegemonic party, and temporarily contain the regime’s crisis of legitimacy. The new 
Congress strategy was encapsulated in the slogan “Garibi Hatao!” (Abolish Poverty!) 
and entailed the cultivation of particularly deprived and degraded social groups, such as 
scheduled castes and tribals. Indira Gandhi’s style, often termed as populist and 
plebiscitary, is characterised as one revolving around majoritarian politics.463  
 
The  Hindu nationalist movement that defined its politics in the idiom of pan-Hindu 
resurgence was confined in its appeal primarily to urban areas of Hindi-speaking north 
India. Hindu nationalism has historically been very much the movement of a relatively 
small, socially and territorially circumscribed minority speaking the political language 
of integral majoritarianism. But during the 1990s it has gained popularity and cannot be 
described as a minority movement anymore. From 1984 on the Congress started to face 
troubles. It lost heavily in provincial elections in two southern Indian provinces, Andhra 
Pradesh and Karnataka, which had stood solidly behind Mrs Gandhi even in 1977, when 
the North had rejected the Congress and supported the Janata tenure that followed. Later 
that year the situation in the major Northern province of Assam went completely out of 
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control because of the regime’s mishandling of a student-led ethno-linguistic movement 
that demanded enhanced regional autonomy, as well as genuine development, in an area 
which remained desperately poor despite its rich natural resources. Even though this 
movement did have separatist overtones, the regime’s response, a combination of 
repression and manipulation, only led to the deterioration of a tense situation and into 
massive violence.464 In the elections of the Jammu and Kashmir provincial assembly, in 
which the Congress had as its rival the National Conference, a predominantly but not 
exclusively Kashmiri Muslim organisation, Mrs Gandhi appealed explicitly to 
communal sentiments among Hindu voters in Jammu. The Congress campaign, 
however, could hardly have evoked the response it did had it not been for the rapidly 
worsening situation in Punjab, where secessionist sentiment had appeared among Sikh 
youth.465  
 
The Congress, with its majoritarian nationalism, had not been able to offer solutions to 
India’s long-term structural problems, but was also constantly creating new crisis-areas 
through its policies. Many of the factors conditioning the 1967 election reappeared in a 
contemporary form in 1989: a crisis of leadership credibility, an economic downturn, 
dissension within the Congress, its non-performance and misrule at the centre and the 
provinces, popular anger with corruption among senior officials, and a general desire for 
change. But there was one crucial difference. The Congress lost in the 1989 elections 
decisively because, unlike in 1967, the issue was no longer one solely related to the 
legitimacy of a particular regime. The crisis was now an organic crisis of state authority 
as such. Congress’ continuation in office was seen as being detrimental to the 
continuation of India as a unified, democratic and secular state.466  
 
In Rajiv Gandhi’s era, the emphasis was switched to technological modernisation, 
symbolised by Rajiv’s obsession with computer use as a mark of progress, and 
expressed by the catchy slogan, “Moving Into the 21st Century”. This vision obviously 
appealed only to the urbanised upwardly mobile classes of Indian society. The other 
noticeable trend was the continuing centralisation of decision making on key issues. The 
result was a correlation between the growing centralisation of power and the increasing 
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powerlessness of the centralisers. By 1989, India was in the throes of a serious 
economic recession and foreign-exchange shortage, the result of economic 
mismanagement by the regimes of Indira and especially Rajiv Gandhi. Since 1989-90 
the organic crisis of the state has only intensified.467 After the electoral decline of the 
Congress, India faced the prospect of a fractionalised multiparty system in which the 
major contenders for national power were the Congress, the Janata Dal, the BJP and the 
Communist Party of India.468 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Indian nationalism and Indian secularism are both attempts to come in terms with multi-
cultural India. They both tried to unite the different ethnic groups and religions of India 
by forming an identity of togetherness: Indianness. For the unity of the country 
Indianness was supported by an Indian form of secularism. They both were aimed at 
guaranteeing the peaceful coexistence of the different religions and ethnic groups of 
India. Indianness was imagined, but it was not accepted by other Indian nationalisms. 
This can be seen in the way the Indian state was alienating from the Indian society when 
it tried to unify the different communities under the state. Indian secularism denied the 
role of religion in everyday life situations in a way that communities could not accept. 
An important aspect of the Indian nationalism was also the promise for a modern India 
with economic growth and well-being of the citizens. The Indian nation-state failed to 
provide this and ‘new Indian’ nationalisms started to emerge and demand the right to 
rule over their own communities on their own conditions. The ‘traditional’ ethnic 
identities were stronger than the central government had assumed, and this quickly led 
to clashes and violence between the different views on the essence of India. The 
violence was often conducted by a political party, which proved that it is nearly 
impossible to limit religion in the private life in India. Therefore, Nehru’s well-wishing 
attempts to keep religion away from politics have more or less failed. The state was also 
not able to respond to the demands of multi-ethnicity and solve the demands 
constructively. Nehru’s advocation for the secularisation of society was not supported 
by the people. Many minorities felt that through the homogenisation their religion and 
culture were being oppressed when trying to create a common version of Indian culture. 
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The democratisation of the state gave the minorities a possibility to organise themselves 
politically and start to protect their own culture, language or religion. Political parties, 
on the other hand, found the feeling of subordination useful for their own purposes and 
started to resort to the religious identity of the people as their basis for political 
mobilisation. Politics communalised in India. 
 
There are two main reasons for the contest of Indian secularism. They are interwoven 
and to some extent also parallel. However, historically, the contest of Indian secularism 
has first happened through the different Indian nationalisms which refused to merge into 
the idea of an Indian nation-state. The ruling power considered that the integrity of India 
was threatened by the secessionist movements, and to maintain the idea of integrity, 
some of the leading politicians of the Congress party have relentlessly pursued the 
project of homogenising diversities. But everything turned out the other way around: 
because of the attempted homogenisation, a growing number of separatists and 
secessionist movements have gained political power in the country. Therefore, 
homogenisation has partly led India into political decay and caused the decline of 
secularism, especially because of the use of oppressing politics, which then has 
consequently induced the rise of secessionist movements. This has then been 
strengthened by the other nationalisms that have benefited the rise of each other: 
Kashmiri nationalism has given impetus to Hindu nationalism and vice versa, but Sikh 
nationalism has also grown because of the rising Hindu nationalism. 
 
Secondly, the contest and the decay of secularism has been the result of the politics of 
the originally secular Congress Party, which has surrendered its secular role several 
times by using communalist tensions to further their political aims. It has also 
surrendered its democratic role by consciously attempting to weaken and even to 
destroy institutions, in the often a mistaken belief that this will strengthen their hands. 
This centralisation and alienation policy led then to the weakening of the Congress 
Party’s effectiveness in controlling communalism. It lost its legitimacy as the state 
power and it has drifted into a crisis of hegemony because of the politics of 
centralisation. The Congress Party resorted to populism in the 1980s as the result of the 
growing communalist movements. This made it possible for the communalist parties to 
start a wide-based mobilisation. The Congress used the national unity and secularism as 
manipulative symbols for electoral mobilisation. Thus, it has been easy for Hindus to 
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rely on Hindu religious symbols in their mobilisation. However, this does not mean that 
it was the fault of the Congress that Hindus have leaned on their own to use cultural and 
religious background to advance their political aims. Because of the contest done by the 
nationalist movements and the unsuccessful politics of the Congress Party to contain 
these movements and to preserve the secular character of its politics the Indian political 
system has failed to hold on to the principles of secularism and democracy, which has 
then consequently deepened the crisis of secularism. The crisis has also brought up old 
cleavages and disputes and therefore it has grown even deeper. The crisis of Indian 
secularism is like a vicious circle.  
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ANNEX I: The Map of Jammu and Kashmir 
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ANNEX II: Hindu-Muslim riots: victims469 
Year               No. of casualties             No. of victims 
 
1954   83  34 
1955   72  24 
1956   74  35 
1957   55  12 
1958   41  7 
1959   42  41 
1960   26  14 
1961   92                   108(139) 
1962   60  43(42) 
1963   61  26(30) 
1964   1070  1919(1703)470 
1965   173  34(30) 
1966   133  45(42) 
1967   209  251(253) 
1968   346  133(87) 
1969   519  674(572) 
1970   521  298(297) 
1971   321  103 
1972   240  70 
1973   242  72  
1974   248  87  
1975   205  33 
1976   169  39 
1977   188  36  
1978   219  108 
1979   304  261 
1980   427  375 
1981   319  196 
1982   474  238 
1983   500  1142471 
1984   476  445 
1985   525  328 
1986   764  418 
1987   711  383  
1988   611  223 
1989   706  1155 
1990   1404  1248 
1991   905  474 
1992   1991  1640 
 
These are official figures and they under-estimate the actual number of casulaties and 
therefore it is not possible to say to what extent. 
                                                          
469
 Table from Jaffrelot 1996, 552. 
470
 This figure is due to an exceptionally high death toll of 985b in the state of Orissa. 
471
 This high figure is due to the anti-Bangladeshi riots in the state of Assam.  
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ANNEX III: Frequency and Casualties of Communalist Incidents472  
Year  No. of incidents                     Persons killed                      Persons injured 
 
1954     84  34   512 
1955     75  24   457 
1956     82  35   575 
1957     58  12   316 
1958     40    7   369 
1959     42   41                         1344 
1960     26  14   262 
1961     92                         108   593 
1962     60  43   348 
1963     61  26   489 
1964 1070                       1919                          2053 
1965   173  34   758 
1966   144  45   467 
1967   198                         251   880 
1968   346                         133                          1309 
1969   519                         673                          2702 
1970   528                         298                          1607 
1971   321                         103                          1263 
1972   240  69  1056 
1973   242  72  1318 
1974   248  87  1123 
1975   205  33    809 
1976   169  39    794 
1977   188  36  1122 
1978   230                         110  1853 
1979   304                         261  2379 
1980   421                         372  2691 
1981   319                         196  2631 
1982   470                         238  3025 
1983   500                       1143  3652 
1984   476                         445  4836 
1985   525                         328  3665 
                                                          
472
 Rajgopal P.R., Communal Violence in India. Uppal, New Delhi 1987, 16-7. Quoted in Nandy et al. 
1995, 7.  
